The Radcliffe Constitutional Proposals for Cyprus (1956)

I have the honour to present to you my recommendations for a new Constitution for Cyprus. I have drawn them up in the form of a single continuous document instead of expressing them in a series of separate recommendations and I hope therefore that they will be capable of speaking for themselves to those who read the document as a whole. At the same time I think it desirable that I should preface them with a brief commentary indicating what have presented themselves to me as the main features of my proposals and the reasons why I have preferred them to other possible arrangements which were proposed to me or which suggested themselves during the course of my work.

2. I am not attempting in this to present to you a formal Report. The conditions under which I have done my work and the general desire that I should make my proposals available within as short a space of time as circumstances allowed would have made that impossible, even if I thought that a comprehensive survey of the Cyprus problem could add much to what is already known and has been often said about its several intractable elements. My recommendations are, in effect, the best Report that I can make.

3. There are one or two preliminary points that I ought to make clear, so that my proposals should not be in danger of being considered in a setting in which I have not intended to place them. The first point is that, though, as requested, I have used all speed in bringing my proposals forward, I have not assumed that the Constitution they envisaged could be put into operation in Cyprus as it is to-day. It is a Constitution appropriate to a state of affairs in which men may express their will by voting and their views by speaking without fear of terrorism or intimidation : in which, on the other hand, Government does not have to impose or maintain those emergency measures, distorting ordinary life, which are the unavoidable counterpart of terrorism itself. In other words, my proposals contemplate a Cyprus in which it has been possible to declare that the present emergency has come to an end. I have no views as to when that time may come. Organised murder and violence have thrown a shadow over the Island which will only lift with the goodwill of many people. But it is possible to hope that the prospect of a Constitution with its fruitful possibilities of peaceful self-government may do something to bring nearer the end of the emergency itself.

4. The other point is that the Constitution which I am dealing with is the Constitution of a territory which is under the sovereignty of Her Majesty The Queen—that, in fact, is what is laid down in the first of my Terms of Reference. It is not therefore within the province of such a Constitution to provide for or to provide against the possibility of a change in the international status of Cyprus or to prescribe conditions or guarantees attendant upon the occurrence of such an event. On the contrary, I think it plain law that there is no power in the Legislature of a self-governing dependency to change the status of the territory by union under a different sovereign. Acts or resolutions directed to such a purpose would be null. If such changes were to come about, they would have to come about by other means and by instruments designed for the purpose. The Constitution as to which I am to make proposals is not one of them and I do not refer to the matter further.

5. It is convenient that at this stage I should set out in full my terms of reference which you communicated to me on the 13th day of September last.

"To make recommendations as to the form of a new Constitution for Cyprus which shall be consistent with the following requirements :-

(a) that during the period of the Constitution Cyprus is to remain under British sovereignty;

(b) that the use of Cyprus as a base is necessary for the fulfilment by Her Majesty's Government of their international obligations and for the defence of British interests in the Middle East and the interests of other Powers allied or associated with the United Kingdom;

(c) that all matters relating to external affairs, defence and internal security are retained in the hands of Her Majesty's Government or the Governor;

(d) that, subject to this, the Constitution is to be based on the principles of liberal democracy and is to confer a wide measure of responsible self-government on elected representatives of the people of Cyprus, but is at the same time to contain such reservations, provisions and guarantees as may be necessary to give a just protection to the special interests of the various communities, religions and races in the island."

6. I have not thought it my duty under this Commission to present to you as my proposals a draft of the complete instrument or instruments which would be needed to bring a Constitution into immediate operation. It would be premature to do so, anyway; but, apart from that, I know by experience that the niceties of legal phrasing and the accumulation of details which, though necessary, are not illuminating, tend to obscure for the reader the true purport of the whole scheme. What matters at this stage is the general outline, and it has throughout been my wish to keep that general outline as clear and simple as possible. My proposals are therefore to be read as instructions for a draftsman, not as a draft itself. I am afraid that in the result I cannot put them forward as being simple, because the complexity of the various interests that have to be recognised and provided for does preclude simplicity. A diarchy itself, such as results from the reservation of certain powers, is a complicated conception. But I hope that I have found a form of expression which is reasonably clear. For that purpose I have avoided technical language as far as I can, I have been explicit at points where much past experience suggests that it might nevertheless be wiser to substitute vagueness for precision and, though my draft has in the end become a great deal more detailed than at the beginning I hoped to find necessary, it does, I think, include everything that a reader, having appreciated the main ideas, would wish to know by way of detail in order to see how they are intended to be applied.

7. In constitutional proposals it is usual that two conflicting influences should weigh against each other. On the one hand there is the natural desire to define terms and to express meticulously the powers and limitations proposed. On the other hand, it is well to recognise that a written Constitution is no more than a legal framework for a political body in which there is inherent the capacity of growth and development. From the latter point of view too rigid a formulation is a positive mischance. I recognise this, and indeed it is hardly necessary to say that no Constitution under which political power is divided can provide answers to all questions or solutions to all problems. But in the conditions under which a Constitution is to be proposed for Cyprus I am firmly of the opinion that the preponderating advantage lies in constructing as precise a framework as is reasonably possible.

8. The conditions are so special that I ought briefly to indicate them. For the last 25 years Cyprus has been governed without political institutions that can be described as responsible or elective, except so far as certain organs of municipal or local self-government have filled the void. The maker of laws and the chief of administration has been the Governor, assisted, of course, by the advice of a Council and of his permanent officials. More than that, if one looks further back into the history of the Island, one sees that no established political tradition has had the opportunity of forming itself in Cyprus. In that setting to undertake the responsibilities of democratic self-government is inevitably to undertake an experiment with but little data to work upon. It seems to me only fair to all those who may be concerned in carrying out the experiment that they should be presented at the outset with as clear a picture as pencil can draw of the range and limits of their respective functions, rather than that the frontiers should be left to be defined by trial and error or constitutional convention. For I fear that under the stress of such day-to-day exploration the constitution itself might begin to crack.

9. There is a second consideration which argues the same way. The new distribution of political power which is involved in the very granting of the Constitution is a matter of the gravest concern to the different communities which make up the people of Cyprus. Whatever recommendations I make, they are bound to be scrutinised with a suspicious care by those who feel with justice that their future is staked upon the form such recommendations assume. I would like to hope that what I put forward will meet those misgivings. But in any event I think that it is to everyone's advantage that the guarantees proposed should be framed in as rigid and as inflexible a manner as may be—and by guarantees I do not mean merely the expression of what I have called in my draft the " fundamental rights " but I mean also the various special provisions, such, for instance, as the placing of broadcasting under public institutional control or the setting up of a Public Service Commission, which I put forward as being no less essential to the preservation of the rights of separate communities than the defined rights themselves. Strictly speaking, it is impossible to set up a representative Legislature in a British colonial territory under a constitution which unalterably limits its powers, unless the constitution is enacted by law of the United Kingdom Parliament itself. But for all that I do put forward what I propose as being in effect a rigid constitution, and the conditions which I suggest should govern any move to vary it on the part of the popular Assembly are such that there seems no practical likelihood of any variation on a matter of substance which affects the interests of the different communities. Even so, a law which seeks to vary the constitutional powers of the Legislative Assembly is one of the very few cases in which, according to my scheme, assent would be reserved by the Governor for Her Majesty and would not be a local matter for him as Governor of Cyprus.

10. There are two main problems involved in the framing of the Constitutional form. The first is, how to express the relationship between the control of external affairs, defence and internal security, which are reserved from the local Legislature, and the control of the other matters which will fall within the scope of that Legislature. The other is, how to impose such restrictions on the local Legislature as to secure effective protection—protection " with teeth "—for the minorities in the Island. When I use the word " minorities " I do not at all forget that the minorities are themselves racial communities which possess, though in varying degrees, historical traditions and religious, cultural and social bonds different from those of the majority race in Cyprus, the Greek Cypriot.

11. As to the first, it results from the reservation of powers that Cyprus will be governed under a system of diarchy. There will be two law-making authorities, their fields distinguished according to their subjects, and two distinct forms of administrative control. The idea of diarchy is familiar enough in the history of the developing relationship between the United Kingdom as an imperial Power and the overseas territories which have come within or passed without her central control. There is great variety in the forms in which it has been expressed—by subjecting Bills in the popular Assembly to the necessity of the Governor's consent before they can be introduced, by the use of an official majority, by leaving the Governor free to withhold assent from numerous categories of Bills if he considers that any one of them prejudices reserved or protected interests, by giving the Governor power to enact legislation on certain subjects in the name of the popular Legislature if the Legislature itself will not take the action required.

12. In the present case I have come to the conclusion that the most suitable form is that which recognises most explicitly the existence of the diarchy and its consequences. Accordingly I have proposed to invest the Governor with full law-making and executive power for his reserved field, and to leave the local Legislature correspondingly full master in its own field. There will thus be two systems of law-making existing side by side but separated according to the difference of subject with which they deal. I regard this as the system of diarchy which is simplest to present as a conception and which is most easily understood by those not concerned with the niceties of its application. If a public emergency should arise that of course must be dealt with by special provisions but it is better that the Crown should not retain any further reserved or supplemental powers of making laws for Cyprus by Order in Council, except the unavoidable power to alter the Order in Council itself which sets up the Constitution. It is better, I think, that the Governor and the local Legislature should be able to feel that, between them, they possess the full law-making powers for Cyprus, so long as the Constitution is in being and is honoured by observance.

13. I do not mean it as a hollow phrase when I say that under my proposals the local Legislature and, as a consequence, the Ministers responsible to it, are intended to be masters in their own, the non-reserved, field. It seems to me that a generous interpretation of my terms of reference in this respect is a fair exchange for the considerable reduction of the full possible scope of responsible self-government which results from the reservation of defence and internal security. Self-government is not, of course, a phrase with a single precise meaning nor does it connote a single identifiable form of government. It has in fact been used to cover a wide gradation of limited political systems amounting to less than full self-government. But in considering the possible application of such measures to a Constitution for Cyprus I have deliberately rejected schemes of " phasing," the progressive release of selected departments by stages into the hands of the self-governing side, each stage measured by proved success in the responsible handling of its predecessor. I do not think such an approach, however appropriate in other circumstances, is appropriate to this Cyprus Constitution. The people of Cyprus-, I have reminded myself, are an adult people enjoying long cultural traditions and an established educational system, fully capable of furnishing qualified administrators, lawyers, doctors and men of business. It is a curiosity of their history that their political development has remained comparatively immature. It is owed, I think, to a people so placed that, when they are invited to assume political responsibility, the offer should be generous in the sense that, within the field offered, no qualification or restriction should be imposed that is not honestly required by the conditions of the problem.

14. Consistently with this I have pared away from my proposals a number of those features that are often present in colonial constitutions, even those which represent a comparatively advanced stage of development. I have not proposed the introduction of any official members into the Legislative Assembly. I have proposed so restricted a number of nominated members, 6 out of a total of 36. that no one can suspect that they represent an obscure attempt to give the Governor a residual influence upon the elected body. On the other hand, nominated members do serve at least the convenient purpose of allowing the smaller minorities to obtain some representation without the formalities of separate communal rolls. In addition I propose that the categories of legislation as to which the Governor is to be free to reserve assent for Her Majesty's pleasure should be reduced to the bare minimum of four : Bills that seek to alter the Constitution in some respect, Bills affecting currency, coinage or foreign exchange, Bills affecting the Royal prerogative, and Bills affecting the trustee status of Cyprus Government stock. In all other matters that come within the self-governing field the Governor is to have the duty of a constitutional head of government to assent according to his Ministers' advice subject to reference to the Supreme Court for a judicial ruling upon any Bill that may appear to be itself repugnant to the various guarantees or restrictions which the Constitution imposes. Lastly, I have omitted altogether any provision for disallowance of Cyprus legislation by Her Majesty's Government except in the single case of legislation prejudicing the trustee status of Cyprus Government stock. In fact the retention of this particular power is needed for purely technical reasons in relation to such Government stock.

15. It is a familiar experience that when different fields of legislative or executive power are separated by reference to subjects as, for instance, in federal constitutions—there is on occasions a difficulty in deciding to which field a particular piece of legislation or executive act belongs. This difficulty will be liable to occur in Cyprus. Words such as " defence " or " internal security " do not carry a precise connotation. It is necessary therefore to face the question whether the dividing line can be drawn with any adequate precision by a process of defining a list of particular matters that fall within the range of these subjects. It would certainly be a great advantage if this could be done : for, if it could be done with even reasonable completeness, it would be possible to get rid of one of the most troublesome of those causes of dispute which disturb the relationship between the authorities responsible for the two sides of government. At any rate, even if the disputes remained, a means of resolving them by reasonable discussion would be available. And that perhaps is as much as anyone can hope to provide.

16. I am satisfied, however, that no good will be done by trying to provide exhaustive definitions. The truth of the matter is that it is the aspect or context in which a particular question presents itself that determines its relation to such subjects as defence or internal security rather than the intrinsic matter with which it deals. This consideration is especially relevant in the case of the Island of Cyprus which contains several very large military and air installations, themselves dependent for effective operation upon some measure of co-ordination with the rest of the Island, including its road communications, its ports and harbours and its water and power supplies. If one wereto begin to enquire what were the matters with which the authority responsible for defence and internal security might conceivably be concerned on some occasion or other, it would be very difficult to confine the list so as not to include quite a large number of those matters that are the normal preserve of internal self government. Some things are obviously the exclusive concern of defence and internal security, the control and discipline of the military forces or of the police force, for instance. Some things are likely for some purposes and on some occasions to touch upon defence and internal security, for instance compulsory acquisition of land and the importation of goods or immigration of persons. But it would not be easy to make any long list of those things of which it can certainly be said that they will not in any circumstance or for any purpose affect the interests of defence or internal security.

17. In that situation the balance of advantage turns against any further definition than is afforded by the description of the subjects themselves. For either external affairs, defence and internal security are defined by a long list of matters which covers all the things capable of coming within their range, even if ordinarily many of them will not : in which case the range of self-governing matters is materially reduced in order to take care of the exceptional occasion. Or, to avoid the inconvenience and unfairness of this, the interests of defence and internal security are to some extent jeopardised by tying them down to a limited range of matters which does not do justice to their possible legitimate range.

18. The solution which I propose involves three provisions which should be considered as interdependent upon each other.

(a) The Governor must be the final judge both upon the question whether action that he feels it necessary to take in the interests of any of his reserved subjects is properly within their range and upon the obverse of this, whether a Bill of the Legislative Assembly presented for assent does or does not trench upon his reserved field. It is not possible to provide for the reference of such questions to an outside referee, such, for instance, as the Supreme Court. Defence and internal security involve matters which cannot be reasonably exposed or debated in public proceedings : moreover, they generally require positive and effective action, and it is not good sense that the validity of such action should be in suspense during the pendency of judicial proceedings.

(b) There should be a consultative body, formed on the highest level, for the purpose of keeping each side—the reserved side and the self-governing side—currently informed as to what the other is doing and, perhaps more important, what it proposes to do and why. Such a body should meet under the chairmanship of the Governor himself and from the start it should aim to meet frequently and to discuss fully. The membership that I propose would consist of Governor and Deputy Governor, Chief Minister and another Minister nominated by him, Minister of Turkish Cypriot Affairs, a representative of the Defence forces, Legal Secretary and Attorney-General. In a body of this kind criticisms can be made and policies explained with a freedom and lack of reserve that could not be expected in an open deliberative Assembly. I have suggested that this body should be styled the Joint Council of Cyprus and I suggest that name in order to mark the importance that I attach to its existence and its functions. Given reasonable good will on the two sides I believe that such an institution could be effective to iron out the many possible causes of friction to which a diarchy gives rise and of which the greater part has its origin in each side's ignorance of what the other is up to and the suspicions and lack of confidence arising from such ignorance.

(c) It is only a development of the idea which lies behind the Joint Council of Cyprus to propose, as I do, that the Governor should have constitutional power to invite the Legislative Assembly to take over from him any particular piece of law-making which, though founally within his reserved field, he can conveniently commit to the self-governing side. A power of this kind seems to me a valuable one. It provides the flexibility along that difficult frontier between what is reserved and what not that everyone would wish to see so long as it is felt that no true interest of defence or internal security is prejudiced by looseness of definition. And it affords a means by which to avoid, again given good will, what might otherwise look like an unexpected inroad by the reserved side into the normal field of self-government. It is my hope that as confidence grows, this power might be increasingly resorted to.

19. I have been critical to examine whether the scheme that I propose for regulating the relations between the reserved side and the self-governing side does in any true sense deny to the latter a generous opportunity of occupying the field of self-government. I am satisfied that it does not. It would be a distortion of the picture to allow the circumstance that at some places and on some occasions the Governor may have to deal with matters that would normally be self-governing matters to suggest that in most places or on most occasions the self-governing field will be invaded in this way. There is no reason why it should be. It will be the Governor's duty to promote the most harmonious relationship that he can achieve between the two sources of authority in the Island, sources which unite him in his two capacities, in one capacity as constitutional head, in the other as autocratic delegate of the Imperial Government.

20. Perhaps the simplest test of the reality of self-government under the system I have envisaged is to recite the names of the Ministries which I have provided for on the self-governing side (apart from the Chief Minister's Office and the Office of Minister for Turkish Cypriot Affairs): Development, Interior and Local Government, Finance, Communications and Works, Social Services, Natural Resources. It is true that these do not correspond to the existing Departments of Government, though they provide convenient groupings of them. But, to translate them into the Departments or Branches of Government as known to the Cypriot to-day I have invited the Administration in Cyprus to draw up a provisional list of those departments or branches which under my scheme might be expected to pass into the self-governing field and so under the Ministerial control of persons responsible to the elected Assembly. I set it out accordingly in the Appendix to this Covering Note.

21. I turn now to the problems of the self-governing side itself, having explained my proposals as to its relationship with the reserved powers. One thing I can draw attention to at once. My general conception is that the Governor should withdraw from active intervention in the work of the self-governing side, assuming instead the important, but different, status of the constitutional " head " on Her Majesty's behalf. Generally speaking, therefore, he will act on the advice of his Ministers, he will not preside at or take part in meetings of the Cabinet or of the Legislative Assembly. Certain decisions must be taken and acts performed on his own authority, as in the case of any other constitutional head. They will all however be found explicitly identified in my proposed scheme. Thus only he can decide on such matters as proroguing and dissolving the Assembly, relieving a Chief Minister of his office, the making of certain appointments, the reference of doubtful Bills to the Supreme Court for advice, the power of pardon. These citations are not exhaustive, but the full list is not a long one.

22. With this said, the chief problem in finding a suitable framework for the powers of self-government is so to design them that on the one hand self-government becomes a means of reflecting truly the will and purpose of the people of Cyprus and on the other it does not become an instrument by which a majority drawn from one community overrides the legitimate claims of a minority community to maintain its own life and customs as an integral part of the life and customs of Cyprus.

23. Everyone knows that Cyprus is not homogeneous. Taking the figures of the 1946 Census (and I have no reason to suppose that since then there has been any substantial change in favour of minorities), the population of the Island is formed, as to about 80 per cent., of Greek Cypriots, as to about 18 per cent., of Turkish Cypriots, and the remaining 2 per cent. consists of smaller communities of British residents, Armenians, Maronites and others. Throughout I take no account of the British armed forces who will be present in the territory from time to time in connection with the base.

24. The influences that make for separation between the communities are strong—religion, language, education, tradition, and custom. They are reflected in the towns by separate quarters for Greek and Turk : in the country by Turkish villages and Greek villages. On the other hand there is only a weak supply of unifying elements which would make for a general consciousness that all the communities are Cypriot communities. True all these statements are generalisations to which there are exceptions. The degree of separation between Greek and Maronite Cypriot must be small to-day. Not all education is special to its own community : there are one or two valuable institutions in which boys from all communities receive the same education side by side. There are mixed villages shared by Greek and Turk. Many Turks speak Greek as well as Turkish, and the English language is a potential instrument of common understanding. But communal separation remains the general factor.

25. How far this separation would be reflected in ability of the Greek and Turkish Cypriot communities to work together politically, I could not say. I am conscious that I do not know enough about the problem. Their representatives have worked together in the past in the service of the Government, in municipal administration, in the activities of co-operative societies and of district improvement boards. In some cases the combination seems to have been happy and unresentful : in others there seem to have been recurring suspicions and complaints on the side of the Turkish Cypriots that discrimination has been practised against them. Whatever the truth of the matter, I have no doubt at all that the circumstances of the last 18 months and the pressure of the Greek Cypriot campaign for Enosis have done much to sharpen the sense of alienation between the two communities, and I think that any plan for the future must accept the fact of this alienation as present now and in the future.

26. The problem comes down to the political relations between these two communities. The figures that I have given show that the remaining communities are too small in numbers for it to be reasonable that they should expect to have anything more than the right to have their voices heard in an elected Assembly and the right to share in the protection of any guarantees that limit the powers of the majority in that Assembly. In fact the representatives of the Armenian community told me that they did not desire to have any special arrangements made for their representation as a community. Their best protection lay in good government for all rather than in separate identification of different interests.

27. I have given my best consideration to the claim put before me on behalf of the Turkish Cypriot community that they should be accorded political representation equal to that of the Greek Cypriot community. If I do not accept it I do not think that it is out of any lack of respect for the misgivings that lie behind it. But this is a claim by 18 per cent. of a population to share political power equally with 80 per cent., and, if it is to be given effect to, I think that it must be made good on one of two possible grounds. Either it is consistent with the principles of a constitution based on liberal and democratic conceptions that political power should be balanced in this way, or no other means than the creation of such political equilibrium will be effective to protect the essential interests of the community from oppression by the weight of the majority. I do not feel that I can stand firmly on either of these propositions.

28. The first embodies the idea of a federation rather than a unitary State. It would be natural enough to accord to members of a federation equality of representation in the federal body, regardless of the numerical proportions of the populations of the territories they represent. But can Cyprus be organised as a federation in this way? I do not think so. There is no pattern of territorial separation between the two communities and, apart from other objections, federation of communities which does not involve also federation of territories seems to me a very difficult constitutional form. If it is said that what is proposed is in reality nothing more than a system of functional representation, the function in this case being the community life and organisation and nothing else, I find myself baffled in the attempt to visualise how an effective executive government for Cyprus is to be thrown up by a system in which political power is to remain permanently divided in equal shares between two opposed communities. Either there is stagnation in political life, with the frustration that accompanies it, or some small minority group acquires an artificial weight by being able to hold the balance between the two main parties. A third alternative, that the Governor should be given under the Constitution some sort of arbitral position as between the two communities, I have already excluded by what I have said above. I do not think that it will be advantageous to embroil the Governor in the internal controversies of the self-governing side. My conclusion is that it cannot be in the interests of Cyprus as a whole that the constitution should be formed on the basis of equal political representation for the Greek and Turkish Cypriot communities.

29. Does the second ground lead to a different result? I do not think so. To give an equal political strength in a unitary State to two communities which have such a marked inequality in numbers—an inequality which, so far as signs go is as likely to increase as decrease—is to deny to the majority of the population over the whole field of self-government the power to have its will reflected in effective action. Yet it might well be right to insist on this denial if the Constitution could not be equipped with any other effective means of securing the smaller communities in the possession of their essential special interests. Not only do I think that it can be equipped with such means by placing those interests under the protection of independent tribunals with appropriate powers and relying only to a limited extent on direct political devices, but I think that the " legalist " solution which this depends on is in fact better suited to provide the protection that is required, and it does not have the effect of denying the validity of the majority principle over a field much wider than that with which special community interests are truly concerned.

30. At this point I will set out the main features of my proposals-which are designed to protect the special interests of the Turkish Cypriot community and its political status.

(a) There will be 6 seats in the Legislative Assembly reserved for members elected on a separate roll of Turkish Cypriot voters. This number is to be compared with 24 seats for members elected on a general roll, in effect a roll of Greek Cypriot voters, and is very slightly more than the proportion attributable to the respective numbers of the two communities. My proposal to introduce 6 nominated members in addition has no material bearing on this and their class must in any event take care of nominees to represent other communities, such as non-Cypriot British residents and Maronites.

(b) The consent of two-thirds of the Turkish Cypriot members will be necessary before the Assembly can pass any law which alters the existing laws of Cyprus regulating Turkish Cypriot domestic affairs, marriage, divorce, Evkaf and Vakfs, &c., or which deals with their educational, religious, charitable or cuLural institutions. On the other hand the Turkish Cypriot community can invite the Governor to make a regulation amending any of those laws if there is no prospect of the Assembly itself being willing to act.

(c) There will be a branch of the permanent administration styled the Office of Turkish Cypriot Affairs under a Minister appointed by the Governor from among the Turkish Cypriot members of the Legislative Assembly. It will be the Government organ for dealing with all the special affairs of the community, including its separate schools and educational system, and will have an allotted share of the Cyprus revenues appropriated for the purpose.

(d) The Minister for Turkish Cypriot Affairs will have a seat in the Cabinet ex officio and will be a" member of the Joint Council of Cyprus.

(e) All legislative acts of the Assembly and all executive and administrative actions or decisions on the self-governing side will be subject to the condition that they must not conflict with certain guaranteed rights relating to religion, education, charitable, religious and cultural institutions and use of languages. Further there must be no discrimination based on birth, nationality, language, race or religion. The independent tribunals to whom complaints about violation of these rights can be preferred will be the Supreme Court, in the case of legislative acts, and the body which I have styled the Tribunal of Guarantees, in the case of executive or administrative actions of Government. If a complaint against a legislative act is upheld, the act, or at least the offending part of it, becomes a nullity. If it is an executive or administrative action that is successfully challenged, the Tribunal will have a discretion as to how best to deal with it including a power to award compensation to a person injured.

31. These are the main, but not the only, provisions which I have proposed for the safeguarding of the position of the Turkish Cypriot community. 1 here are others, minor in themselves, which yet make up in combination a system under which the community is secure of its place in the conduct of public affairs. It is my hope that together they will be thought to justify the view that, even under a system which concedes an electoral majority to the Greek Cypriots in the Legislative Assembly, the interests of the smaller community can be effectively protected and that the safeguards that are offered are not mere " paper " guarantees.

32. I have passed over several points in setting out my conclusion, and I return to those of them which need explanation. For instance, I do not propose that the Legislature of Cyprus should comprise a second Chamber. While I have been conscious of what I may call some general expectation that my proposals would include a recommendation of a second Chamber, I have been much less clear what was the purpose that such a Chamber would be intended to serve. Yet there is no point in designing all the complications of a bi-cameral Legislature unless the designer is clear what are the advantages to be secured by thus duplicating the legislative authority.

33. A second Chamber may serve various purposes. It may act as a substantive check on the activities of the first Chamber in the sense that nothing can become law that does not secure the support of a majority in each Chamber. But then the second Chamber must have a membership constituted on a principle different from that of the first Chamber. Otherwise the check is illusory. I have met suggestions that there should be a second Chamber for Cyprus formed on a functional principle of representation, comprising representatives of municipalities, religious, educational, and business organisations, trade unions, &c. So there might be, in theory. But the idea offers no solution in itself. First, the significance of such a Chamber in acting as an effective check upon the other Chamber depends entirely upon the weighting that is given to the different bodies represented as between the two opposed communities. In deciding on the weighting one transfers to the formation of the second Chamber just the same controversy on a matter of principle that I have been discussing with regard to the first. And an answer has to be given, one way or the other, to the same question—Is it right to deny validity to the will of the majority for general political purposes? Secondly, I am bound to say that a scheme of functional representation for a political body, though attractive to me in theory, is not one which I would be ready to recommend for introduction into Cyprus unless I had had much more opportunity than I have had for working out its actual composition with the help of Cypriot representatives on the spot. Certainly, I could not put it forward as a system of representation that is usual or widely used to-day.

34. But then a second Chamber can serve other purposes than that of being a full partner in the Legislative body. It can be designed to act as a limited check upon the first Chamber, either by exercising a power to delay, though not finally to prevent, the realisation of the will of the first or by acting as a revising agent, subject of course, to the readiness of the first Chamber to accept the revisions proposed. No doubt these are useful functions, though they may seem more attractive to the members of a second Chamber that has dwindled from the historical status of full partner than to the members of a new body created from the first to serve no wider purpose. But I do not think that their utility is sufficient to justify the introduction of two separate Chambers into the Legislature proposed for Cyprus. The political field must, after all, be a comparatively small one; and the advantage lies in looking for an arrangement which will concentrate all the best available talent in one deliberative and law-making body, rather than for an arrangement that will dissipate that talent among two separate bodies. Incidentally, the work of revision does not essentially require the existence of two separate Chambers. It can be carried out, not necessarily with less ultimate effectiveness, by a special committee of a single Chamber, with or without expert assistance from outside. On the whole, therefore, I came to the conclusion that no sufficient advantage would be gained by a bi-cameral structure, when there had to be set on the debit side the importance of simplicity, of facing a single Chamber squarely with the responsibility for its own decisions, of avoiding distracting controversies between the two Chambers, and, lastly, of bringing all the available political talent into a single responsible assembly.

35. If a second Chamber is favoured as itself the means of protecting minority rights I can only say that I do not think that it would be likely to prove a good instrument for that purpose. Compared with a system that allows resort to a competent and independent tribunal, I think it a poor one. In fact it is difficult to see how it can avoid going too far or not far enough. Either it gives the minority a general political power more extensive than is required for its proper protection, thereby distorting the political distribution, or it makes the minority judge in its own cause as to what its special interests are and what is needed for their protection : or on the other hand, avoiding this, it gives the minority no more than a nuisance value and so fails to achieve even its legitimate intention.

36. With regard to the franchise I recommend the simplest scheme that is possible. I believe this to be the best way to launch the Cyprus Constitution among all the controversies that will attend its birth. Accepting as I do the necessity of a separate communal roll for Turkish Cypriots, I have enquired whether it would be possible to propose some mitigation of the drawbacks of thus perpetuating communal separation by introducing into Cyprus some scheme for a common roll upon which both Turkish Cypriot and all other voters would have an additional vote for a limited number of candidates. Such candidates, it might be hoped, conscious of their dependence upon a mixed constituency of voters, would be less likely to pursue strictly communal policies than candidates elected on separate rolls. I think that perhaps they would, and the idea that lies behind such schemes may well commend itself to Cypriot statesmen of the future. If so, measures can be taken to introduce it if it has the necessary support. But there is little experience available as to how such schemes have worked out in practice, and any version of this double franchise would present the voter in Cyprus with a more complicated election issue than I think appropriate for the opening stages of popular self-government. Besides, theory is one thing and electoral management is another : and in the shortage of experience, I do not feel any sufficient confidence as to the results of such a scheme in practice. A similar conviction of the importance of insisting on all possible simplicity in the franchise arrangements has led me to propose that there should be no option for Turkish Cypriots to register on the general roll. It seems to me inconsistent with the plan of guaranteeing the community a number of seats proportionate to its total numbers that it should be possible for members of the community to leave the necessary minimum on the separate roll to cover those seats and transfer the residue of their voting power to the election on the general roll.

37. In one matter I have departed on my own responsibility from the franchise rule which previously held good in Cyprus and which was, as I understand, proposed to be retained in more recent discussions on a new Constitution. I propose that women should be admitted as voters equally with men. I cannot think that this is any great innovation, since they already enjoy the vote for certain purposes of local government. Considering that female franchise is now so widely accepted and that it is in operation in the United Kingdom, in Greece, and in Turkey, I think that if I proposed adherence to the old rule of male franchise I might be thought to be recommending a form of self-government for Cyprus that deliberately departed from liberal or progressive ideas. That would be an unfortunate misunderstanding.

38. I hope that my proposals as to the position of the Supreme Court and the Tribunal of Guarantees speak for themselves. It is plain enough that I am attaching great importance to the contribution that the judicial power can make to the resolution of inter-communal disputes in Cyprus. And, if inter-communal disputes can be resolved, a large part of the political difficulties of self-government disappears with them. It is indeed a grave responsibility for a judicial tribunal to decide upon the validity of legislative acts or to confirm or annul the administrative acts of Government. But it is, after all, a judicial function that has been discharged acceptably by the Courts of many countries under many systems. The first great written Constitution of modern democracy, that of the United States, owes its interpretation and a large measure of its development to the claim asserted by its Supreme Court to be, the final arbiter whether legislative acts of Congress were valid or invalid under the Constitution. And the judicial power has been allotted a similar responsibility under the federal Constitutions of Canada and Australia. there is no necessary connection between a federal Structure and a judicial power to decide whether legislative acts are repugnant to the Consitution. Indeed the Governor's power, which I propose to refer a doubtful Bill to the Supreme Court for advice before giving assent is modelled fairly closely on a similar provision in the Constitution of the Republic of Eire.

39. It may be said that Cyprus is a small stage when compared with these territories, and I have asked myself critically whether the duty that I seek to lay upon its Judges is not too heavy for the circumstances of the case. Can they not only achieve the detachment required but also obtain from the public the credit for that detachment? Both are necessary, if their responsibility is to be discharged. I can only say, after going into the matter, that I believe that both objects can be realised, provided that one condition is accepted. The Chief Justice himself must be appointed from outside Cyprus and the number of Supreme Court Judges from inside Cyprus must always be equally balanced between Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot. Given a President of the Court who by virtue of his origin is uncommitted to either community in the eyes of the public, I do not feel any misgivings as to the confidence that will be placed in the Judges' impartiality. The Cyprus judiciary enjoys a high reputation for conscientious performance of its duties and I think that, so formed, the Supreme Court can safely be entrusted with the responsibility that I propose.

40. The Tribunal of Guarantees is, so far as I know, a novelty in any Constitutional scheme derived from British sources, though it may be recognised as a reflection on a very small scale of the Conseil d'Etat in France. I think that it will be a useful institution. I was impressed by the point reiterated to me that, if there is a tendency by members of one community to discriminate at the expense of the members of another, it is at least as likely that the discriminating will be found in the administrative as in the legislative field. I agree with this and while I do not assume that discrimination has been an abuse in Cyprus in the past—though I am aware of complaints on the matter—nor do I assume that it will be the more present in the future, I think that it is advantageous to provide for a tribunal to which all complaints can be preferred and impartially investigated. The reason why I do not regard this as work altogether suitable for the Supreme Court is partly that it would be unfortunate to risk overloading that Court with a number of inquiries that are not legal matter in the strict sense and partly that the experience and, I think, the practice and procedure which best suits such a tribunal is rather different from that appropriate to a regular Court of Law. But the need for an independent Chairman remains the same.

41. I have now completed my brief commentary on the main outline of my proposals. But there are two activities for which the Government of Cyprus is either responsible or with which it is directly concerned that I have not found it possible to fit into my general scheme of self-government without imperilling the basis of equitable protection for each community upon which it is constructed. One of these activities is broadcasting, the Cyprus Broadcasting Service being at present a branch of Government itself : the other is those educational activities, either conducted by Government or aided by it, which are not reserved for individual communities.

42. To explain the problem raised by these two activities I must clear the ground by stating my general assumptions as to the control of education and information under self-government. The present Department of Education provides out of public funds the major part of the cost of all elementary education, which is carried on in separate schools and under separate systems according to the community concerned. Secondary education, with the exceptions that I have referred to above, is also the separate concern of each community, Greek and Turkish Cypriot. Virtually no Greek Cypriot secondary school is in receipt of Government grant at present; on the other hand grants are received by Turkish Cypriot secondary schools. With the institution of self-government it is to be supposed that governmental relations with Greek Cypriot education will be handled by a department of education under a Greek Cypriot Minister, while Government relations with Turkish Cypriot education will come under the Office of Turkish Cypriot Affairs and its Minister. Information and public relations in general will pass to the self-governing side; but that will not preclude the Governor from setting up independently whatever office for information and public relations relating to his reserved matters he may think necessary for their presentation.

43. Broadcasting does not fit into such a scheme of division. It is as much a normal internal service for the use of Cyprus as, say, electric power and water and, as such, should fall among self-governing matters. On the other hand, it is most important for the future happiness of the island and its people that broadcasting should be kept secure from the impact of party or political controversies and, above all, from any tendency to favour one community at the expense of another. Yet no one who has had experience of the problems of controlling the output of a medium such as broadcasting could suppose that impartiality could be effectively enforced by an outside tribunal, as the Tribunal of Guarantees, or by any form of external reference. Semel emissum volat irrevocabile verbum. The essential things, balance. allocation of times, impartial presentation, depend on a right system at the source. I do not think, therefore, that it affords a proper protection for the minority communities that broadcasting should be treated merely as one of the normal incidents of self-government and should pass accordingly under the control of a Minister responsible to the elected majority in the Legislative Assembly.

44. Is there then an acceptable alternative? It would be possible, in theory, to place broadcasting under the control of the Governor himself, not as a reserved or security matter but as a special inter-communal service which he should hold as an impartial trustee for all communities. Yet I cannot bring myself to favour this as a solution. It runs counter to the general line of policy which I recommend, that of withdrawing the Governor from active embroilment in the controversies which may divide the two main communities. Fortunately there is an alternative arrangement which presents itself as much to be preferred.

45. What I recommend is that broadcasting should be turned into a chartered public institution, on the lines of the B.B.C., charged with an independent public responsibility so to conduct the service as to hold a fair balance between the interests and claims of the different communities. I do not think that one can define the duty except in some vague general terms such as these. The important thing is that those in control of the service should be and should be recognised as being independent of external control or pressure as to all matters relating to the content and handling of the output. For this purpose the composition of the governing board needs rigid definition. My proposal is that it should be so formed that Greek and Turkish Cypriots have equal representation upon it and that, if a difference has to be weighed in the scales, the vote of an independent Chairman should decide between them. It does not seem to matter in this case whether he comes from inside or outside the Island, so long as he is not thought to be committed to either side. But I do not think that a member of the public service in Cyprus would be suitable for the appointment.

46. There are two points that I ought to stress before leaving the subject of broadcasting. One is that my proposal does not merely involve that the conduct of broadcasting as an independent public institution would be a good way of starting off under a self-governing Constitution. It is much more than that. It involves that this method of treating broadcasting as an essential feature of the distribution of powers under the Constitution is in its own way as much a guarantee of minority rights as other more obvious provisions. The other is that I do mean that those who conduct the service should be genuinely free from outside control as to its content : and that this applies to the Governor as much as to any other political authority. This principle does not exclude reasonable provisions in the Charter regulating access to the service for the dissemination of official notices and information.

47. My second problem is concerned with inter-communal education. This rather uncouth phrase denotes those activities in the Cyprus educational system which are not confined to any one community. As they stand they can be set down on a very short list—the English School for boys at Nicosia, the American Academy for boys at Larnaca, the American Academy for girls at Nicosia, the Teachers' Training College for men, the Teachers' Training College for women. In addition plans are now maturing for certain commercial and technical schools to be conducted by Government : and an impressive Technical Institute is nearing the completion of its layout at Nicosia. The current cost to Government of its part in the whole activity is of the order of £150,000. It is envisaged that it may rise to £500,000 when present plans are completed, but there are capital sums of some £1½ million that will need to be found apart from what is already earmarked in the Cyprus Development Fund.

48. Certain things can be said without argument about these activities. The English School is not a school for the English any more than the American Academy is a school for Americans : they are schools in which Greek, Turkish, Armenian and other Cypriot boys are educated together. Nor is the English School or the American Academy a place for administering English or American educational systems to young Cypriots or for trying to impose upon them any new national loyalties. What they do is to provide a different curriculum from that in force in the separate Greek and Turkish Cypriot secondary schools and an approach to education which, just because they are inter-communal, is based on a rather wider and more general conception of its purpose. It is one of the admirable characteristics of the people of Cyprus that they have a sincere appreciation of the importance and value of education. The education offered by the intercommunal schools is, so experience shows, much sought after by parents, as are the opportunities afforded by Government scholarship grants to obtain the advantages of higher education outside Cyprus. Such a system of education cannot honestly be regarded as a challenge to the separate systems which are followed in the Greek and Turkish Cypriot secondary schools or as a threat to bring about " dehellenisation " in the Greek schools—a threat to which members of the Greek Cypriot community have been sensitive during the period of direct Governor's rule. But the inter-communal system and all its intangible advantages arising from the mixing of the children of the different communities at the formative period of education do provide a valuable supplement to the other, separate, systems of education. Taking a reasonably long view, such a means of education provides, as I see it, one of the most hopeful paths toward a mitigation of the racial separations which are at the bottom of the problem of Cyprus. And it is a path which no one is compelled to take. Those who enter on it enter by their parents' free choice.

49. What then is to become of inter-communal education under the new Constitution? It does not fit into the pattern of the Greek Cypriot department of education or the office of Turkish Cypriot Affairs. It is by its nature a service that bridges the two without belonging to either. If it passes, as a general subject of self-government, into the control of a Minister responsible to an elected majority in the Legislative Assembly, I think that it may well be putting too heavy a burden upon him to expect him to support it and to further its possible developments in the face of hostile opposition from those who can see good only in the traditional curriculum of Greek Cypriot separate education. So either we must face the possibility or the probability that this activity, however beneficial to Cyprus, will be allowed to fail through lack of the means of support, or an exception must be made to secure its continuance by placing the instruments of inter-communal education under a special board responsible to the Governor, not to the Legislative Assembly. A board formed for this purpose should in my view invite the assistance of Greek and Turkish Cypriot' members interested in education, but should have an independent Chairman. This is the expedient that I propose. I will mention later what I regard as the financial implications of such an arrangement.

50. It only remains for me to give such explanations as seem called for with regard to the financial provisions which are set out in Section P of the constitutional proposals. I have left it to the last to deal with these points, since I take it to be an uncontroversial principle that the financial arrangements should be adjusted to suit the substantive proposals rather than that those proposals should themselves be subordinated to some fixed financial conceptions which may be ill-suited to the very special circumstances in which a new Constitution for Cyprus would have to be set on foot.

51. The diarchy which is involved in the reserved powers over defence and internal security involves in my view that there will be two separate public funds for Cyprus, one controlled by the Governor for the purpose of those fields of administration which are retained in his charge, the other being the produce of the Cyprus revenues which will be available to be raised and appropriated according to the decisions of the self-governing Assembly and Ministers.

52. The monies needed for the purpose of defence in Cyprus will be provided, I assume, from United Kingdom funds and will not be regarded as a charge upon the revenues of Cyprus except to the extent of the sum of £10,000 which is its standing annual contribution to Imperial defence. I am not concerned to express a view upon the question whether £10,000 or some larger sum is the right figure for this purpose, but I think it almost obvious that the very large sums which are being expended in Cyprus over a period of years towards its full equipment as a base are not expended for the defence of Cyprus itself regarded in the limited sense as a territory unconnected with the British defence system as a whole. It is relevant that these large demands on labour and material and the consumption demands of the troops stationed on base duty do, and will, bring considerable prosperity to the Island out of the United Kingdom money spent there, even though most of it is not an expenditure economically productive. This may be a good reason for increasing the fixed charge of £10,000 which for my purposes I have assumed as the contribution figure. But I do not think that anyone would suppose that it alters the general principle that Cyprus revenues cannot properly be charged with the creation and development of the defence base.

53. The next item is the cost of internal security. which in substance is the cost of the Police Force and the prison service. What difficulties there are in providing for this cost can be discussed in terms of the Police and I will confine my explanation to this. The question that I have had to face is this : Should the cost of the Police Force be met out of the revenues of Cyprus, although the control of that force, including its strength, equipment, rates of pay, &c., is a reserved matter and not therefore within the range of self-government? I think that a question of this sort is peculiar to the special system which is proposed for Cyprus under which the police power is a reserved power. Internal security is, of course, a necessary service to civilised government. That means that self-government in Cyprus could not exist without some police force and the expenditure needed to maintain it and I deduce from that that it would be wrong that nothing should be required from Cyprus revenues to pay for Police, even though the control of the force is not on the self-governing side. But does it follow from that that the whole cost of the force should be found by Cyprus? That conclusion is a very big jump from the first, and I have not been able to persuade myself that it would be just to impose this charge when the special circumstances that affect the Cyprus police force are understood. In my view the only fair thing is some sharing arrangement.

54. What is happening is that the Cyprus Police force is undergoing a thorough reorganisation. The outbreak of the emergency in April 1955 is thought to have shown up serious deficiencies in numbers, training and organisation. The scheme of reorganisation is only now getting under way and it will be years before it will be completed according to the new scale that is designed for it. One or two figures will show the measure of the change. In 1954 the Police expenditure was about £600,000. The establishment authorised at the close of that year was Officers 51, Other Ranks 1,363. The total strength as recommended by the recent Report of the Cyprus Police Commission, 1956, and accepted by the Government is approximately 3,000 all ranks, rather more than double. Disregarding special expenditure which will not recur when the emergency is over, the future level of recurrent expenditure planned for Police is some £2,625,000 to £3,125,000 and that on Prisons is in the region of £125,000. To this must be added a very considerable capital expenditure on rehousing the police and on new buildings, which plan, if fully implemented, will require another £5 million over the next five years.

55. None of this expenditure will be controllable by the Legislative Assembly. No doubt Police matters will be canvassed in the Joint Council of Cyprus, but the responsibility for the strength and organisation of the Force will remain with the Governor. I do not think that the situation would be improved if an official representative were to attend the Legislative Assembly and answer questions relating to the Police. It could be done, but where there is neither control of finance nor control of policy I doubt if question and answer are a useful expedient.

56. The total Cyprus revenue for 1956 was about £12 million, itself representing a remarkable advance over recent years due largely to the pressure of defence expenditure. Even if £12 million* is taken as a representative annual figure, it looks as if about 25 per cent. of it would be needed to be appropriated for Police costs, if the whole burden were to be thrown on Cyprus.

57. My conclusion is that it would be unjust to Cyprus to make such a requirement, whatever the future level of Cyprus revenues. I ought to say, though, that I have not detected any reason for supposing that they will show much increase in the next few years, while one item of importance may well decline. I think that it would be a bad thing to try to start constitutional self-government on a financial basis that is itself unfair. Internal security and defence are separate subjects, but they are not entirely distinct. It seems to me only reasonable to say that the necessity to create and to maintain a thoroughly effective police force in Cyprus is in part a recognition that we must be secure in the use of our base. What I recommend therefore is that a sum should be fixed as an annual contribution from the Cyprus revenues towards the total cost of Police and Prisons, to be paid into the Defence Fund, and that the balance should be provided by Her Majesty's Government out of United Kingdom funds. I thought it reasonable, if a formula had to be found, to turn to 1954, the year before the emergency broke out, to find a " normal " basis for police expenditure in Cyprus and then to write the figure up to the higher scales prevailing in 1956. That has produced the figure of £750,000 for Police and Prisons that I use in my proposals. I ought to add that, though I am firmly committed to the principle of sharing, I am not committed to the actual figure. Considering how deficient even the 1954 establishment (it was not filled) may be thought to have been shown to be in the light of what has happened since, my figure may be rather too favourable to Cyprus.

58. With regard to broadcasting I do not find that the same difficulties arise. It is a service for the people of Cyprus in the full sense : and the mere fact that the need to safeguard the different interests of the various communities has led me to propose that its control should not be placed under the elected Assembly does not provide any good reason why the finance for it, so far as it is not self-financing out of licences and advertisements, should not continue to be met out of Cyprus revenues. I have no right to suppose that it will at any time be self-financing. It runs at a deficit of some £100,000 at present. When a planned extension of facilities has been completed, as it shortly will be, it is hoped to reduce the annual deficit to a figure in the region of £50,000. What I propose is that the annual estimates should be approved by the Governor in consultation with the Minister of Finance and the Minister for Turkish Cypriot Affairs. He should then be empowered to send a precept to the Finance Minister for the amount required to meet the estimated deficit and the sum so certified will thus become a charge on Cyprus revenues. I recommend also that the Broadcasting Corporation's annual accounts should be laid before the Legislative Assembly with a report on them by the Auditor-General.

* The figure of 12 million was taken from the official Estimates for 1956, presented by the Governor to the Executive Council on 27th March, 1956. After the submission of this Report it was brought to my notice that Cyprus revenue for 1956 is now estimated as likely to amount to about £13.5 million ; on the other hand the expenditure for the same period is expected to increase still more, above the previous estimates. These facts should be recorded ; but the point that paragraph 56 is dealing with remains the same.

59. There remains the financing of inter-communal education. Valuable as such education is, it is not nor is it likely to be a major item of anyone's budget. As I have said, even allowing for planned developments, its annual cost to Government is not expected to be more than £500,000. And the enquiries that I have made do not suggest that, with the shortage of suitable teachers and facilities, any large-scale development could be undertaken in any near future. But what fund ought to bear the charge of it? It is in the same situation as broadcasting in the sense that it is purely a Cyprus service for the benefit of Cypriots : on the other hand, unlike broadcasting, and pro tanto, the police, it is not a necessary service, since it merely supplements other systems of education for the benefit of those parents who wish their children to be educated in this way. For reasons that I have explained I am proposing that inter-communal education should be placed under the Governor, with the help of an education board on which Greek and Turkish Cypriots will be equally represented. Neither its maintenance nor its possible development will therefore be under the control of the Legislative Assembly or the Cabinet of Ministers. The position is anomalous, and I think that the best thing is to look for a practical solution rather than to try to apply some general principle which has no real application to the case. My recommendation is that the necessary funds should be found by Her Majesty's Government out of United Kingdom resources as a supplement to the monies already provided or promised for the economic development of Cyprus. It will be a worthwhile gift from the people of this country to the people of Cyprus, and at a time when such large expenditure has to be incurred in the island for the more general purposes of defence it is not a bad thing that this and other development monies should be visibly expended at the cost of the British taxpayer for the direct benefit of the internal purposes of Cyprus.

60. My proposals therefore call for financial contributions from the United Kingdom to two special purposes—to pay for part of internal security and to pay for inter-communal education. I think that the reasons why these contributions are called for are valid independently of the rise or fall of Cyprus revenues in general or the taxing policy pursued by the Cypriot Government, because these reasons arise out of the constitutional structure itself. On the other hand, it is my view that, if these contributions are measured and provided as I have proposed, they close any question of further contributions from United Kingdom sources in general aid of the Cyprus budget. Cyprus is not, so far as any investigations of mine have led me, one of those territories which should require or expect a grant in aid in supplement of general administration. Nor do I think that such a system, with the attendant complications of more or less detailed Treasury inspection and approval of each year's budgetary position, is consonant with the conception of free and independent control of self-governing matters which I have made the basis of my constitutional proposals.

61. I could not finish this covering memorandum without acknowledging gratefully the help that I have received during the course of my work. Before I do so I may take the opportunity of stating without qualification upon what authority my proposals rest, since I would prefer them to be criticised for the merits or demerits of what they in fact contain rather than for not being what they have at no time purported to be. The sole responsibility for the proposals is mine. They are not the outcome of negotiations, since negotiations have not taken place : nor do they represent suggestions which have been made to and worked out with any or all of the parties principally concerned. The reasons that prevented the holding of any round-table conference are familiar and do not need enlargement from me. On the other hand it would be misleading to allow the impression to prevail that my proposals have been produced in ignorance of the main attitudes and positions of these parties.' Those are not difficult to ascertain for anyone who has the opportunity, as I have had, to study something of the history of Cyprus since 1878, of its constitutional controversies, and of the successive sets of proposals and discussions that are recorded from time to time up to the present day. Moreover, during the two visits to Cyprus that I have paid in the last four months I have not lacked means of learning at first hand of the attitude of the Turkish Cypriots, which has been presented to me officially, or something at first or second hand of the points of view of the Greek Cypriot and of the other communities in Cyprus.

62. I have received sincere and generous assistance from the Governor of Cyprus, His Excellency Sir John Harding, his staff and all members of the administration in Cyprus, British, Greek and Turkish, with whom I was brought into contact. They spared no effort to make my visits informative or to make it possible for me to see and hear what I could during the time that I was there. The members of the Colonial Office in London whom I have called upon for advice have always been ready to let me draw upon their fund of knowledge and experience. Lastly, I can put on record my grateful appreciation of the services rendered by the two secretaries of my Commission, Mr. Geoffrey Cassels in Cyprus and Mr. Derek Pearson of the Colonial Office, without whose able co-operation my work would have been much longer and even more difficult.

(Signed) RADCLIFFE.

London,

12th November, 1956.

APPENDIX TO COVERING NOTE (see paragraph 20)

PROPOSED DEPARTMENTS AND FUNCTIONS ON THE SELF-GOVERNING SIDE

CHIEF MINISTER

C.M.'s Functions

Cabinet Office, District Administration,
Ceremonial, London Office.

Ministry for Development

Development Programme.

OFFICE FOR TURKISH CYPRIOT AFFAIRS

Turkish Cypriot Affairs including Turkish Education and Relations with Turkish Religious Bodies.

MINISTRY FOR FINANCE

Financial Affairs

Budget, Estimates, Inland Revenue, Treasury, Audit.

Economic Affairs

Economic Policy, Banking, Customs and Excise, Commerce and Industry, Grain Commission, Co-operative Development.

MINISTRY FOR THE INTERIOR AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT

Legal and Judicial Affairs, Official Receiver and Registrar, Local Authorities, Planning and Housing, Information Services and Public Relations, Touring, Antiquities, Printing.

MINISTRY FOR COMMUNICATIONS AND WORKS

Public Works, Roads, Road Transport, Ports, Airports, Port Administration, Civil Aviation, Posts, Relations with Electricity Authority, Relations with C.I.T.A.

MINISTRY FOR SOCIAL SERVICES

Greek Education, Medical, Labour, Welfare, Relations with Religious Bodies.

MINISTRY FOR NATURAL RESOURCES

Agriculture and Veterinary, Forests, Water Development, Lands and Survey, Geological Survey, Mines.

STATEMENT OF PROPOSALS

INDEX

A.I.-PURPOSE OF THE CONSTITUTION

A.II.-GOVERNOR AND LEGISLATIVE ASSEMBLY

B.-GENERAL DISTRIBUTION OF POWERS

1) Governor's Matters.

2) Self-Governing Matters.

3) Governor to act through Ministers.

4) Variation of the Constitution.

C.-SELF-GOVERNING MATTERS

C.I.-RESTRICTIONS AND GUARANTEES

1) General.

2) Religion.

3) Institutions and Schools.

4) Language.

5) Non-discrimination.

6) Expropriation.

7) Access to the Courts of Law.

8) Turkish Cypriot Affairs.

C.II-THE LEGISLATIVE ASSEMBLY

1) Establishment of Legislative Assembly.

2) Turkish Communal and other Representation.

3) Qualifications for Voting.

4) Qualifications for Election as a Member.

5) Nominated Members.

6) Vacation of Seats.

7) Constituencies.

8) Speaker and Deputy Speaker.

9) Language.

10) Privileges and Immunities of Members.

11) Oath of Allegiance.

12) Standing Orders.

13) Sessions of the Assembly; Prorogation and Dissolution.

14) Quorum.

15) Frequency of Elections.

16) Salaries and Allowances of Members.

17) Clerk and Deputy Clerk of the Assembly.

18) Government Gazette.

19) Power to vary certain provisions of the Constitution.

C. III.—THE EXECUTIVE

1) The Chief Minister.

2) Other Ministers.

3) The Minister for Turkish Cypriot Affairs.

4) The Cabinet.

5) The Secretary to the Cabinet.

6) The Departments of Government.

7) Permanent Secretaries of Ministries and Offices.

8) Termination of Tenure of Office of Chief Minister.

9) Termination of Tenure of Office of other Ministers.

10) Governor to be kept informed of Cabinet business, &c.

D.-GOVERNOR'S MATTERS

1) Power to make Ordinances.

2) Validity of Ordinances.

3) Publication of Ordinances.

4) Matters falling to be dealt with by Ordinance.

5) The Governor's Secretariat.

6) Governor empowered to issue directions to Public Officers.

7) The Legal Secretary.

8) The Defence Committee.

9) Governor to have regard to the Restrictions and Guarantees.

10) Governor to submit proposed Ordinances to Her Majesty when directed to do so.

11) Governor not empowered to impose taxation.

E.-THE JOINT COUNCIL OF CYPRUS

1) Establishment of Joint Council.

2) Governor to summon and preside.

3) Membership of Joint Council.

4) Functions of the Council.

5) Governor's duties in relation to Council.

6) Legal Sub-Committee.

5) Governor's power to delegate to the Assembly the power to make laws affecting reserved matters.

F.-ASSENT TO LEGISLATION

1) No Bill to become Law before signification of Assent.

2) Provisions applicable to Assent.

3) Laws assented to may be challenged in legal proceedings.

4) The Reservation of Assent in matters affecting Currency, &c., the Royal Prerogative, Trustee Stock and the Constitution.

5) Assent in cases where Turkish Cypriot Affairs are concerned.

6) Assent in cases where the position of Public Officers will be affected.

7) Governor will signify assent in other cases.

G.I.-THE JUDICATURE

1) Establishment of a Supreme Court.

2) Composition of Supreme Court.

3) Manner of appointment of Judges.

4) Retirement of Judges.

5) Removal of Judges.

6) Salaries of Judges.

7) Supreme Court to determine validity of certain Laws.

G.II-THE JUDICIAL SERVICE COMMISSION

1) Establishment of the Commission and its functions.

2) Membership of the Commission.

3) Appointments, &c., by the Commission.

4) Chief Justice to exercise control over Judges, &c.

H.-BROADCASTING.

1) Broadcasting to be conducted by the Cyprus Broadcasting Corporation.

2) Functions of the Corporation.

3) Establishment of a Board of Trustees and its functions.

4) Appointment of Trustees.

5) Powers of Corporation to accept advertisements, and to enjoy revenue from the issue of Broadcasting licences.

6) Corporation to present annual report to Governor.

I.-INTER-COMMUNAL EDUCATION

1) Establishment of a Board of Inter-Communal Education and its functions.

2) Composition of the Board: salaries.

3) Co-option of additional members.

4) Decision of questions before the Board.

5) Board to be responsible to Governor.

6) Certain existing establishments to be taken over by the Board.

K.-THE PUBLIC SERVICE AND THE PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSION

1) Establishment of a Public Service Commission and its functions; certain public officers to be excluded from its purview.

2) Composition of Public Service Commission; appointment of Members; tenure of office.

3) Certain persons not to be eligible for appointment to the Public Service Commission.

4) Salaries of Members of the Public Service Commission.

5) Powers of the Governor in relation to Public Officers within the range of the Public Service Commission.

6) Power to make Regulations in respect of functions of Public Service Commission.

7) Appointments of certain officers excluded from the ambit of the Public Service Commission.

L.-AUDITOR-GENERAL AND ATTORNEY-GENERAL

1) Auditor-General.

2) Attorney-General.

3) Salaries of Auditor-General and Attorney-General.

M.-TRIBUNAL OF GUARANTEES

1) Establishment of a Tribunal to enquire into allegations of discrimination, &c.

2) Jurisdiction of the Tribunal.

3) Submission of complaints to Tribunal: Power of Tribunal to determine its procedure.

4) Promulgation of decisions of the Tribunal.

5) Power of Tribunal to summon witnesses and require the production of documents.

6) Action where complaints are proved to be well founded.

7) Jurisdiction in respect of Governor's matters.

8) Appointment, salaries, &c., of Members.

9) Composition of Tribunal.

10) Registrar of the Tribunal.

11) Tribunal to report annually to the Legislative Assembly.

N.-AMENDMENT OF SPECIAL TURKISH LAWS

O.-GOVERNOR'S POWERS OF PARDON

P.I.-FINANCE : SPECIAL PROVISIONS

1) Cyprus Broadcasting Corporation.

2) Inter-Communal Education Board.

3) Police Force and Prisons.

4) Turkish Cypriot Affairs.

P.II-FINANCE : SELF-GOVERNING MATTERS

1) The Cyprus Consolidated Fund.

2) Minister of Finance to have annual Estimates prepared.

3) Estimates to be submitted to the Assembly.

4) Supplementary expenditure.

5) Charges on Consolidated Fund.

6) Issue of warrants in some cases.

P.III.-FINANCE : GOVERNOR'S MATTERS

1) The Defence Fund.

2) Governor to make an Appropriation Ordinance annually.

3) No monies to be paid without the warrant of the Governor.

4) Audit of Defence Fund.

Q. EMERGENCY LAWS

APPENDIX A

A.I.-PURPOSE OF THE CONSTITUTION

The purpose of the Constitution is to provide for and to regulate the exercise of political power in the Island of Cyprus as a territory which is under the territorial sovereignty of Her Majesty The Queen.

A.II.-GOVERNOR AND LEGISLATIVE ASSEMBLY

(1) There will be a Governor and Commander-in-Chief in and over Cyprus who will have the powers and duties prescribed by the Constitution. He shall perform those duties in accordance with the Constitution and will exercise his powers in accordance with any instructions that may be given to him from time to time by Her Majesty either by Royal Instructions or through a Secretary of State.

(2) The Governor will be appointed by Her Majesty's Commission. There will be a Deputy Governor appointed by the Governor.

(3) There will be a Legislative Assembly for Cyprus and a Cabinet of Ministers responsible to that Assembly, who will have the powers and duties provided in the Constitution. They shall exercise those powers and perform those duties in accordance with the Constitution.

B.-GENERAL DISTRIBUTION OF POWERS

(1) The power to make laws and to conduct all aspects of executive administration in respect of the following matters :

(a) external affairs;

(b) the defence of Cyprus, either directly or indirectly as involved in the fulfilment by Her Majesty's Government of their international obligations and the defence of British interests in the Middle East or the interests of other Powers allied or associated with the United Kingdom;

will be retained in the hands of the Governor. These matters (a), (b) and (c) are called " Governor's matters."

(2) Subject to the retention of Governor's matters, the general power to make laws for the good government of Cyprus will be exercised by the Legislative Assembly. No such law will be valid as a law until the Governor has signified assent to it, but except in special cases which are provided for in the Constitution the Governor will signify that assent if a Bill has been duly passed by the Legislative Assembly.

Matters which come within the competence of the Legislative Assembly under the Constitution are called " self-governing matters."

The power of the Legislative Assembly to make laws on self-governing matters will be subject at all times to : —

(a) the provisions of the Constitution which safeguard the special interests of the various communities, religions and races in Cyprus and guarantee certain fundamental rights to all persons in Cyprus;

(b) the provisions of the Constitution which except the subjects of broadcasting and inter-communal education, and accord them special treatment in the interests of the different communities in Cyprus;

(c) the provisions of the Constitution which prescribe the Governor's duty to withhold or reserve assent to a Bill on the ground that it falls within a certain class or deals with certain matters, as later set out, or to make an Ordinance prevailing over other laws if he is of the opinion that the Ordinance is necessary in the interests of foreign affairs, defence or internal security;

(d) the provisions of the Constitution which allow for the making of Emergency Laws during a period of public emergency.

(3) Subject to the same restrictions, so far as relevant, the administration of government and the executive power in respect of self-governing matters will be exercised by the Governor through Ministers chosen from the Legislative Assembly. It will be his duty to act on their advice in such matters, except in those cases where the Constitution provides that he shall act at his discretion or after some prescribed form of consultation or recommendation.

(4) The provisions of the Constitution cannot be altered or revoked by Ordinance of the Governor or by Law of the Legislative Assembly except as follows :

(a) where the Constitution explicitly provides that a particular matter can be dealt with or altered by the Legislative Assembly, then it may be dealt with or altered accordingly so long as any prescribed conditions are properly observed;

(b) without prejudice to (a) any provisions as to the constitution, powers and procedure of the Legislative Assembly may be altered by it by law passed for the purpose if such law is concurred in by

(i) a majority of the members of the Legislative Assembly elected on the General Roll;

(ii) a majority of the members of the Legislative Assembly elected on the Turkish Cypriot Communal Roll;

(iii) a majority of the nominated members of the Legislative Assembly.

C.—SELF-GOVERNING MATTERS

C.I.-RESTRICTIONS AND GUARANTEES

(1) The provisions contained in the following paragraphs are fundamental restrictions on the powers of self-government to be granted by the Constitution, and no law, regulation or official action can conflict, interfere with or prevail over them.

(2) Religion.—All persons will be entitled to the free exercise in public or private, of any creed, religion or belief, the observance of which is not incompatible with public order and good morals.

(3) Institutions and Schools.—All persons acting individually, in association, or as a community, will be entitled to establish, maintain, manage and control at their own expense any charitable, religious and cultural institutions, and any schools and other instructional establishments, provided that such institutions, schools and establishments are so conducted as to be compatible with public order 'and good morals, with the right to use their own language and to exercise their own religion freely therein.

(4) Language.—All persons will be entitled to the free use of any language in private intercourse, in commerce, religion, in the press, or in publications of any kind or at public meetings.

(5) Non-discrimination.—There shall be no discrimination against any person on account of birth, nationality, language, race or religion. For this purpose discrimination means any action prejudicial to an individual which is based on his birth, nationality, language, race or religion as the case may be, and is not justly required by the circumstances of that birth, nationality, language, race or religion.

(6) Expropriation

(i) No person shall be deprived of any property, movable or immovable, by compulsory power unless it be for public purposes and unless just compensation is provided for the deprivation, to be made available with all reasonable expedition.

(ii) Any law authorising such deprivation of property shall secure to every claimant for compensation the right of access to the Supreme Court of Cyprus for the determination of the amount (if any) to be paid.

(iii) This guarantee will not extend to action taken for the divesting or taking possession of property in any case to which the duty to make compensation would not normally be regarded as applicable.

(7) Access to the Courts of Law.—There shall, be equality of access to the Courts of Law for all persons, whether individuals, associations or corporations. This guarantee is subject to the rules of law concerning proceedings by enemy aliens in time of war.

(8) Turkish Cypriot Affairs.—It shall not be lawful for the Legislative Assembly to make

(a) any law which repeals or alters the provisions of any of the following enactments, viz. :-

The Turkish Family (Marriage and Divorce) Laws (1951 and 1954).

The Turkish Religious Head (Mufti) Law (1953).

The Turkish Family Courts Law (1954).

The Evkaf and Vakfs Law (1955), or

(b) any law which deals with Turkish Cypriot educational, religious, charitable and cultural institutions or activities or any other matter which is exclusively of Turkish Cypriot concern (all of which matters are hereinafter referred to collectively as " Turkish Cypriot affairs "),

unless such law is supported by the votes of not less than two-thirds of the members of the Assembly elected by voters on the Turkish Cypriot communal roll.

C. II.-THE LEGISLATIVE ASSEMBLY

(1) There will be a Legislative Assembly consisting of a Speaker, a Deputy-Speaker and 36 other members.

(2) Six members will be elected by voters on a Turkish Cypriot communal roll, 24 will be elected by voters on a general roll, six will be nominated by the Governor. The Turkish Cypriot roll will be reserved exclusively for members of the Turkish Cypriot community : no member of this community may be entered as a voter on the general roll. All other persons qualified to vote will be entered on the general roll.

(3) Qualifications for Voting

(i) Sex : Male or Female.

(ii) Age : 21 years or upwards.

(iii) British subject born in Cyprus or otherwise legally a " native " of Cyprus if ordinarily resident in Cyprus.

(iv) Any other British subject ordinarily resident in Cyprus for two preceding years except persons not domiciled in Cyprus who are in the armed service of the Crown.

(v) Freedom from such disqualifications as mental incapacity, imprisonment, conviction for a previous electoral offence, as may be prescribed by the electoral law for the time being in force.

(4) Qualifications for election as member

(i) The same qualifications as those required as qualifications for voting, except that a member must be at least 25 years of age at date of election;

(ii) must not be under any acknowledgment of allegiance to a Foreign Power;

(iii) must not, unless specially excepted, be holder of Public Office or member of Civil Service or otherwise in service of Her Majesty;

(iv) must not be undischarged bankrupt;

(v) must not have any responsibility for compilation or revision of any electoral register, or any connection with the conduct of the election.

(5) Nominated members will be appointed by the Governor in his discretion. It will, however, be his duty to try to secure that at all times one at least of the nominated members is a British subject resident in Cyprus who belongs to the non-indigenous British community and that of the others one at least belongs to the Maronite community. A Nominated Member's qualifications will be the same as those required of an elected member.

(6) Vacation of seats. A member's seat will be vacated by :

(a) resignation;

(b) death;

(d) dissolution of the Legislative Assembly.

(7) Constituencies

(i) There will be 30 Constituencies, 24 General (excluding Turkish Cypriot) and six Turkish Cypriot, each constituency providing one seat in the Legislative Assembly.

(ii) Every voter will be entitled to one vote, to be exercised in his appropriate constituency.

(iii) There will be six Electoral Districts, namely Nicosia, Kyrenia, Famagusta, Larnaca, Limassol and Paphos. These districts will be divided into the 30 General and Turkish Cypriot Constituencies according to the scheme of division set out in Appendix A.

(iv) Prior to the first election that takes place under the Constitution the physical boundaries of the constituencies will be determined by a person appointed by the Governor to act as Commissioner for this purpose.

(8) The Speaker and Deputy-Speaker

(i) There will be a Speaker and a Deputy-Speaker who will be appointed by the Legislative Assembly at the beginning of each new Assembly according to the majority votes of the members. They may be chosen from the members of the Assembly or from outside the Legislative Assembly provided that if an elected member becomes Speaker or Deputy-Speaker, the seat in his constituency shall be declared vacant and a by-election shall be held to appoint a new member in his place. If at any time the Speaker is a Greek Cypriot, the person chosen to be Deputy-Speaker must be a Turkish Cypriot : if a Turkish Cypriot, the person chosen to be Deputy-Speaker must be a Greek Cypriot. But no Turkish Cypriot may be chosen to act as Speaker or Deputy-Speaker unless he is approved for that purpose by at least two-thirds of the members of the Legislative Assembly elected by voters on the Turkish Cypriot communal roll.

(ii) The duty of the Speaker will be to preside at the sittings of the Legislative Assembly, to regulate and conduct the business of the sittings, and in all things to be the guardian of the order and dignity of the proceedings of the House.

(iii) The Deputy Speaker shall exercise the duties of Speaker in the absence of the Speaker.

(iv) Neither the Speaker nor the Deputy Speaker will be entitled to vote in the Legislative Assembly or to take any part in its proceedings except in his capacity as such Speaker or Deputy Speaker.

(9) Language

(i) Members will be entitled to address the Legislative Assembly in the English, Greek, or Turkish language as they please, provided that an immediate oral translation of the speech into either or both of the other languages must be made available if any member so requests and the Speaker so directs.

(ii) There is to be a printed record of speeches affording translations of each speech into the other two languages.

(iii) All Bills and records are to be printed in English, Greek and Turkish. In case of doubt the English text is to be accepted as definitive.

(10) The Privileges and Immunities of members shall be such as may be prescribed by any Law passed for that purpose by the Legislative Assembly, provided that no more extensive privilege or immunity on any matter may be enjoyed by a member than that enjoyed by a member of the House of Commons of the United Kingdom.

(11) Each member of the Legislative Assembly before taking his seat shall take an oath or make an affirmation to the effect that so long as he is a member of the Assembly he will faithfully discharge his duties as a member of the Assembly and conduct himself as a loyal subject of Her Majesty.

(12) Standing Orders.-Prior to the first meeting of the Legislative Assembly the Governor will cause to be prepared a set of Standing Orders to govern the proceedings of the Legislative Assembly. These will be laid before the Legislative Assembly and shall be operative as its Standing Orders until any part of them is amended or revoked by resolution of the Legislative Assembly and except so far as they are so amended or revoked, provided that no such amendment or revocation shall be effective unless the majority voting in favour of it includes a majority of the Turkish Cypriot and nominated members combined. No Standing Order shall preclude the right of a member to address proper questions to a Minister.

(13) Sessions of the Legislative Assembly.-There must be at least one session of the Legislative Assembly in the course of each year. The Governor will have power to prorogue or dissolve the Legislative Assembly at his discretion provided that he will not exercise such powers on any occasion without previous consultation with the Chief Minister.

(14) Ten members shall constitute a quorum for the transaction of business in the Legislative Assembly. Unless otherwise provided in the Constitution the decisions of the Assembly will be by majority vote.

(15) Frequency of Elections.-A Legislative Assembly shall not be capable of remaining in being for a longer period than four years from the date of the preceding general election. It may be dissolved by the Governor before that time, but, unless so dissolved by him it shall stand dissolved automatically by the expiration of that period.

(16) Salaries and Allowances.—Members will be entitled to receive a salary and allowances in respect of their membership. An initial scale will be drawn up and published by the Governor before the date of the first general election under the Constitution, but the Legislative Assembly will have power to alter the scale at any time by a law passed for this purpose.

(17)-(i) There is to be a Clerk of the Assembly, who will be responsible for the preparing and circulating of Daily Orders and Notices of Motion, the custody of records, and the recording of votes. He will also be charged with the supervision of the administrative work incidental to the business of the Legislative Assembly.

(ii) The Clerk will be a Member of the Public Service. He will be appointed by the Speaker after consultation with the Chairman of the Public Service Commission, provided that the Governor may make a temporary appointment of a Clerk prior to the meeting of the first Legislative Assembly.

(iii) The Clerk shall be subject to retirement at the age prescribed for the retirement of Public Officers in Cyprus, but shall not be removable except on a resolution of the Legislative Assembly requiring his removal on the ground of misconduct or infirmity of body or mind, provided that no resolution shall be effective unless the majority voting in favour of it includes a majority of the Turkish Cypriot and nominated members combined. His salary shall be fixed by the Governor.

(iv) There shall be a Deputy Clerk whose appointment and conditions of service will be the same as those of the Clerk. If the Clerk is a Greek Cypriot the Deputy Clerk is to be a Turkish Cypriot, and if the Clerk is a Turkish Cypriot the Deputy Clerk is to be a Greek Cypriot.

(18) There shall be an official publication entitled The Government Gazette. Every Bill which is intended to be brought before the Legislative Assembly shall be published in the Gazette at a reasonable interval of time before it is to be brought forward unless the matter appears too urgent to admit of the delay involved.

(19)-(i) The Legislative Assembly will have power at any time to pass an Electoral Law altering as it thinks fit all or any of the provisions set out above which relate to :—

Qualifications or disqualifications for voting.

Qualifications for election as member.—Sex and age.

Constituencies.-Division and boundaries, but not so as to affect the total number of members.

Frequency of elections.-Duration of the Assembly, provided that the term shall not in any case exceed four years.

(ii) No such alteration which is intended to apply to voters on the Turkish Cypriot Communal roll, or to members elected by such voters, or to Turkish Cypriot constituencies, shall be operative unless it is supported by at least two-thirds of the members elected by voters on the Turkish Cypriot Communal roll.

C.III.-THE EXECUTIVE

(1) There will be a Chief Minister to act as the Head of the Government in self-governing matters. He will be appointed by the Governor according to his discretion but it will be the Governor's duty to select for this purpose-the person who appears to him to command the largest measure of general support among the members of the Legislative Assembly.

(2) The Governor will appoint such other persons being members of the Legislative Assembly to act as Ministers as shall be recommended to him by the Chief Minister.

(3) Apart from the Chief Minister and the other Ministers there will be a Minister for Turkish Cypriot Affairs who will be responsible for an Office dealing with Turkish Cypriot Affairs. He will be appointed by the Governor at his discretion from among the members of the Legislative Assembly elected by voters on the Turkish Cypriot communal roll.

(4) The Chief Minister, the Minister for Turkish Cypriot Affairs and the other Ministers appointed by the Governor shall constitute the Cabinet.

(5) There will be a Secretary of the Cabinet who shall be present as secretary at all its meetings. It will be his duty to ensure that meetings are summoned with due notice of the business proposed, that proper records are kept of all business done and decisions made, and that such decisions are duly communicated to the departments of Government concerned.

(6) The following will be the Departments of Government apart from the Chief Minister's Office and the Office for Turkish Cypriot Affairs : Ministry of the Interior and Local Government, Ministry of Finance, Ministry of Communications and Works, Ministry of Social Services, Ministry of Natural Resources, Ministry of Development. It will be within the power of the Legislative Assembly at any time by law passed for the purpose to add to or reduce the number of departments or to change their responsibilities and functions.

(7) There will be a Permanent Secretary for each Department and Office, who will be a public officer. Subject to the general direction and control of his Minister and to his instructions on matters of policy the Permanent Secretary will exercise supervision over the department for which his Minister is responsible.

(8) The Governor may at any time in his discretion relieve the Chief Minister of his office : but he will not do so unless he is satisfied either that the Chief Minister does not enjoy the general support of the majority of the members of the Legislative Assembly or that his removal is urgently required by the public interest. If at any time he is so satisfied he shall so inform the Chief Minister, whereupon the latter will be entitled to request the Governor to dissolve the Legislative Assembly with a view to testing the views of the electorate. Unless the Governor decides that for some special reason which bears upon the public interest it would not be right for him to accede to this request, of which special reason he shall inform the Chief Minister, he will dissolve the Legislative Assembly accordingly.

(9)—(i) The Governor may at any time in his discretion, but only after consultation with the Chief Minister, relieve any of the other Ministers (except the Minister for Turkish Cypriot Affairs) of his office and appoint in his place a successor recommended by the Chief Minister.

(ii) Upon the office of Chief Minister becoming vacant all other Ministers except the Minister for Turkish Cypriot Affairs shall be deemed ipso facto to have resigned their respective offices, provided that until a successor is appointed in his place each Minister will remain responsible for carrying out the normal duties of his office.

(iii) The Governor may at any time in his discretion relieve the Minister for Turkish Cypriot Affairs of his office and appoint another member of the Legislative Assembly similarly qualified in his place.

(10) It will be the duty of the Chief Minister to keep the Governor currently informed upon all matters relating to the policies of the Cabinet and to report to him accordingly. In addition, the Secretary of the Cabinet shall send to the Governor copies of all Cabinet papers at the time when they are circulated to members of the Cabinet.

D.-GOVERNOR'S MATTERS

(1) The Governor will have power whenever he thinks necessary to make laws with respect to Governor's matters. Such laws shall be called Ordinances. Each Ordinance shall be prefaced by a declaration to the effect that the Governor is of opinion that it is necessary for the purposes of external affairs, defence or internal security, as the case may be, to make the legislative provisions that it contains : and an Ordinance so made shall have the full force of law notwithstanding that it is in conflict with any other laws or enactments in force in Cyprus and to the extent necessary shall prevail over such laws.

(2) If an Ordinance is made by the Governor in the form prescribed neither his power to make it nor its validity shall be capable of being questioned in any Court of Law.

(3) Unless the Governor decides to the contrary because of the urgency of the matter prior notice of an intended Ordinance will be given in the Government Gazette. All Ordinances will be published in the Gazette as soon as they are made, and duly recorded. The publication will be in three languages, English, Greek and Turkish, and in case of doubt the English text is to be accepted as definitive.

(4) The following matters are enumerated as matters which in some cases it will always and in other cases it may sometimes be necessary to treat as included within the range of Governor's matters by virtue of the fact that they involve external affairs, defence or internal security, provided that the list is not to be taken as being exhaustive of the range of those subjects nor does it connote that there will not be aspects of some of those matters which have no bearing on the retained subjects and thus do not come within the scope of Ordinances :-

(a) the control and discipline of naval, military, air and police forces and the control and regulation of naval vessels and of air navigation and aircraft;

(b) the compulsory acquisition of land and buildings as required in connection with Governor's matters, for example for naval, military, air force or police purposes or for purposes connected with air navigation or aircraft;

(d) lands, buildings, docks, harbours and waters used for naval, military, air force or police purposes or for the purposes of any of the Governor's matters;

(e) prisons and the prison service;

(f) importation of goods;

(g) immigration, naturalisation of aliens, issue and visa of passports;

(h) postal and telegraphic censorship;

(i) shipping, air, telegraphic and wireless services between Cyprus and other countries;

(j) relations with foreign States, with any other part of Her Majesty's Dominions, or with the United Nations or Specialised Agencies of the United Nations.

(5) The Governor will maintain such secretariat and will, maintain or create such departments as he may think requisite to carry out the powers and duties of Government with regard to Governor's matters.

(6) The Governor's executive authority in respect of Governor's matters will extend to the giving of instructions to public officers in any department of the public service in Cyprus, if the Governor considers that these instructions are necessary for the execution of his retained powers. If any such order is given on any occasion the Governor must at the same time inform the Minister concerned.

(7) There will be a Legal Secretary to the Governor who will be responsible for advising him on all legal questions relating to the making of Ordinances and the exercise of power over Governor's matters or his duties as Governor. The Legal Secretary will also be responsible for initiating, conducting and if necessary discontinuing prosecutions for criminal offences arising under any Ordinance or otherwise relating to defence and internal security.

(8) There will be a Defence Committee under the presidency of the Governor for the purpose of advising him with regard to Governor's matters. The Committee will consist of the Deputy Governor, the Legal Secretary, representatives of the naval, military and air forces in Cyprus and such other persons as the Governor may invite to be members.

(9) In the making of any Ordinance and in authorising or requiring any executive act in respect of Governor's matters, the Governor must have regard to the Restrictions and Guarantees which have been set out above and will conduct his own administrative policy in conformity with what they require.

(10) The Governor shall comply with any instructions that may be given to him from time to time either by Royal Instructions or through a Secretary of State requiring him to submit any proposed Ordinance for approval before it is made. Apart from that any Ordinance made by the Governor may be disallowed by Her Majesty through a Secretary of State and shall cease to have effect as soon as the fact of disallowance has been made public.

(11) The Governor's power to make Ordinances will not extend to a power to raise money by taxation.

E.-JOINT COUNCIL OF CYPRUS

(1) There will be a body to be known as the Joint Council of Cyprus which will have for its primary purpose the consideration and discussion of matters of common concern to the retained side and the self-governing side of Government.

(2) The Council will meet from time to time as summoned by the Governor. He will preside at its meetings; in his absence the Deputy Governor will preside.

(3) The Council will consist of the following members : the Deputy Governor, the Chief Minister, one other member of the Cabinet appointed on his recommendation, the Minister for Turkish Cypriot Affairs, one of the service members of the Defence Committee designated by the Governor, the Attorney-General and the Legal Secretary. Members of the Council shall take a prescribed oath of secrecy.

(4) The Council shall endeavour to harmonise the relations between the two sides of government and to eliminate occasions of conflict by anticipating and discussing them. For this purpose the Council shall be kept informed, so far as may be reasonably practicable, as to legislation proposed by either side and as to proposed administrative action, and shall take such matters into its consideration.

(5) The Governor will invite the views of the members of the Council on matters discussed and will give due weight to the views expressed, but he will not be under obligation to act in accordance with them or in accordance with any particular preponderance of views.

(6) There will be a Standing Legal Sub-Committee of the Council, consisting of the Legal Secretary and the Attorney-General. One of its functions will be to settle which prosecutions for criminal offences are to be conducted by the Legal Secretary as affecting Governor's matters and which by the Attorney-General as affecting self-governing matters. For this purpose an officer to be known as the Director of Public Prosecutions may be set up to act as a channel between the Police and the Legal Sub-Committee with authority to act under the general instructions of the Committee.

(7) If at any time it shall appear to the Governor that some matter which he has power to deal with by way of Ordinance as being within the Governor's matters can with equal advantage be dealt with by a law of the Legislative Assembly, he may authorise and invite the Legislative Assembly to make a law for the purpose as if the matter were a self-governing matter and therefore within its powers. The authority will be conveyed by a special Ordinance, which shall specify any necessary limitations and conditions upon the authority conferred.

F.-ASSENT TO LEGISLATION

(1) No Bill passed by the Legislative Assembly shall become law unless and until the Governor has signified assent to it.

(2) The following conditions will apply to the Governor's action in giving his assent :-

(a)—(i) If he is of opinion that a Bill either deals in whole or in part with any matter that is one of the Governor's matters or includes provisions relating to such matters going beyond those which he has by Ordinance authorised the Legislative Assembly to enact, he will withhold his assent.

(ii) The Governor's decision to give or withhold assent will not be capable of being challenged, and if he signifies assent to a Bill the assent shall be conclusive of the question whether the Bill deals with Governor's matters or self-governing matters.

(iii) If the Governor withholds assent in any case it will be open to him, if he so decides, to return the Bill to the Legislative Assembly with an intimation that he can only signify assent if specified alterations are made to it with a view to taking it outside the range of Governor's matters. If the Bill is so amended he will signify assent accordingly.

(b)—(i) If it appears to the Governor that a Bill or any part of a Bill is or may be repugnant to the provisions of the Constitution which guarantee certain rights or otherwise limit the legislative power of the Legislative Assembly (except those provisions which relate to the division between Governor's matters and self-governing matters, as to which he shall be the sole judge) he may refer the Bill to the Supreme Court for a decision on the question whether the Bill or any specified parts of it are so repugnant.

(ii) An appeal shall lie from the decision of the Supreme Court to the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council.

(iii) No assent may be given pending the pronouncement of the decision of the Court or, if there is an appeal, pending the determination of the appeal.

(iv) The decision of the majority of the Judges of the Supreme Court shall be the decision of the Court and shall be pronounced in open Court by a single Judge, and no other opinion, assenting or dissenting, shall be pronounced or its existence disclosed.

(v) The Governor will not signify assent to a Bill which, or any part of which, has been decided to be repugnant to the Constitution. But if part only is held to be repugnant, he may return the Bill to the Legislative Assembly with an intimation that an amended Bill may be submitted.

(3) The fact that the Governor has signified assent to a Bill without referring it for advice to the Supreme Court will not preclude any person interested from subsequently challenging the validity of the law in legal proceedings on the ground that it is repugnant to the Constitution (except that the assent is conclusive on the question whether a law deals with Governor's matters or self-governing matters).

(4) Reservation of Assent.—The Governor will not, without having previously obtained Her Majesty's instructions through a Secretary of State, signify assent to any Bill which in his opinion falls within any of the following classes :—

(i) a Bill altering the Constitution, powers and procedure of the Legislative Assembly;

(ii) a Bill affecting the currency of Cyprus or its coinage or affecting foreign exchange or its control;

(iii) a Bill affecting the Royal prerogative;

(iv) a Bill affecting the Trustee Status of any Cyprus Government Stock, and any such Bill after enactment will be capable of being disallowed by Her Majesty.

(5) Turkish Cypriot Affairs.—No Bill shall be presented to the Governor for assent unless it is accompanied by a certificate signed by the Attorney-General to the effect that it does not affect Turkish Cypriot affairs or, alternatively, that if it does affect Turkish Cypriot affairs it was passed with the concurrence of the necessary two-thirds of the members of the Legislative Assembly elected by voters on the Turkish Cypriot communal roll.

(6) Public Officers. No Bill which affects the position of a Public Officer shall be presented to the Governor for assent unless it is accompanied by a certificate signed jointly by the Attorney-General and the Chairman of the Public Service Commission to the effect that its provisions do not involve the breach of any contractual obligation or, where no contract is involved, that they satisfy the standard of obligation of a good employer.

(7) Subject to the foregoing, the Governor will signify assent to a Bill duly presented to him.

G.I.—THE JUDICATURE

(1) There shall be a Supreme Court of Cyprus.

(2) The Court shall consist of a President who shall be the Chief Justice of Cyprus and two other Judges. The Legislative Assembly shall have power to increase the number of Judges from time to time provided always that the total number of members of the Court must always be an uneven number, that there shall at all times be an equal number of Judges belonging the Greek Cypriot and the Turkish Cypriot communities respectively, and that the Chief Justice shall always be a person who is not native of Cyprus or resident therein at the time of his appointment.

(3) The Chief Justice shall be appointed by the Governor at his discretion after consultation with the Chief Minister. The other Judges of the Supreme Court shall be appointed by the Governor at his discretion after consultation with the Chief Justice.

(4) Judges of the Supreme Court shall retire at the age of 65 or such greater age as the Legislative Assembly may prescribe but shall be eligible for reappointment by the Governor for a further period of twelve months.

(5) A Judge of the Supreme Court will hold office during good behaviour, and will be removable only by the Governor. The Governor will not be entitled to remove a judge on the ground of misconduct unless a recommendation to that effect has been made by a judicial tribunal expressly appointed by a Secretary of State for the purpose of enquiry into complaints of such misconduct and the recommendation has been confirmed by the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council.

(6) The salaries of the Chief Justice and of Judges of the Supreme Court shall in the first place be on the scale in force at the date when the Constitution comes into force. No Judge's salary shall be diminished during his term of office, nor shall his right to pension be altered to his disadvantage. Subject to that the salary of the Chief Justice will be such as may be fixed by the Governor from time to time and the salaries of other Judges such as may be determined by the Legislative Assembly.

(7)-(i) The Supreme Court shall have original jurisdiction in all proceedings in which the validity of any law of the Legislative Asembly is called in question as being repugnant to the provisions of the Constitution which limit the legislative power of the Legislative Assembly (except those provisions which relate to the division between Governor's matters and self-governing matters, as to which the Governor shall be the sole judge).

(ii) A question of repugnancy may be raised by any person interested and in any proceedings. If such a question arises in a Court of Law other than the Supreme Court the issue shall be transferred to the Supreme Court for decision.

(iii) If a law or any part of it is so adjudged to be repugnant, it shall be treated as having had no legislative effect whatever unless the Supreme Court shall affirmatively decide that such parts of the Bill as are not repugnant are capable of being accorded independent legal operation.

G.II.-THE JUDICIAL SERVICE COMMISSION

(1) There shall be a Judicial Service Commission for the purpose of advising the Governor in relation to the appointment, promotion, termination of appointment, dismissal and disciplinary control of Judges (except the Judges of the Supreme Court) and judicial officers.

(2) The members of the Commission shall be as follows :

(i) The Chief Justice.

(ii) The Attorney-General.

(iii) The Chairman of the Public Service Commission.

(iv) Two persons appointed by the Governor in his discretion being in each case either a judge or retired judge of the Supreme Court or a President or retired President of a District Court, or the Legal Secretary.

(3) The appointment, promotion, termination of appointment, dismissal and disciplinary control of judges (except the Judges of the Supreme Court) and judicial officers shall be vested in the Governor acting on and in accordance with the recommendation of the Judicial Service Commission, provided that :

(a) it shall be the duty of the Commission at all times to hold a fair balance between the claims of members of the different communities to opportunities of judicial service so far as the needs of the service allow;

(b) other things being equal a candidate of local origin shall be preferred when recruitment is being considered.

(4) The Chief Justice shall be responsible for transfers of judges and judicial officers and shall have general responsibility with regard to the administration of the courts and the conduct of judicial business.

H.-BROADCASTING

(1) Broadcasting for reception by the public in Cyprus by sound or television shall be a public monopoly service conducted by a Corporation to be known as the Cyprus Broadcasting Corporation.

(2) The Corporation will be constituted by charter with the appropriate exclusive rights and the Charter will charge it with the duty of conducting the broadcasting service with impartial attention to the interests and susceptibilities of the different communities in the island and with due regard to the interests of minorities. Services will be required to be provided in English, Greek and Turkish, and it will be the Corporation's duty at all times to keep a fair balance in the allocation of hours and in other matters between the claims of the communities concerned.

(3) The right to determine the policies and to direct the management of the Corporation and the ownership of its assets will be vested in a Board of Trustees consisting of five persons, of whom two must be Greek Cypriots, two Turkish Cypriots and one, who will be Chairman, must be neither Greek Cypriot nor Turkish Cypriot. Questions before the Board will be decided by a majority of votes and in the event of an equality of votes at any meeting the Chairman will have a second or casting vote.

(4) Trustees will be appointed by the Governor in his discretion after consultation with the Chief Minister, and will hold office for a fixed term of years. The remuneration of the Chairman and the other Trustees will be fixed by the Governor.

(5) The Corporation will be entitled to accept advertisements for broadcasting, if the Trustees so decide, provided that the advertisements must not conflict with its general duty of preserving impartiality and fair balance. It will also enjoy the revenue arising from the issue of wireless licences.

(6) The Trustees shall present an annual report to the Governor on the Corporation's activities, which shall be laid before the Legislative Assembly.

I.-INTER-COMMUNAL EDUCATION

(1) There shall be a Board for inter-communal education which will be charged with the following functions : —

(a) to maintain and develop facilities for education and instruction on the basis that such facilities are available to members of the different races and communities without distinction;

(b) to supervise the curriculum followed in the schools, colleges and institutes coming within their jurisdiction, to engage and dismiss staff, to supervise discipline and generally to be responsible for the superior management of such establishments;

(c) to appoint such Boards of Management for the various schools, colleges and institutes as may seem to them appropriate;

(d) to give financial or other support to any schools, colleges or institutes in Cyprus which, though not maintained by the Board, are affording such inter-communal education;

(e) to institute and further schemes for scholarships or other forms of assistance for higher education outside Cyprus;

(f) to advise the Governor on matters concerned with inter-communal education.

(2) There shall be three members of the Board, who will be appointed by the Governor at his discretion. Provided that suitable persons are available, one must be a Greek Cypriot, one a Turkish Cypriot, and the third, who shall be Chairman, must be neither Greek Cypriot nor Turkish Cypriot. They will be entitled to receive such salaries as the Governor shall determine.

(3) Subject to the Governor's approval the Board will have power to co-opt additional members.

(4) Questions before the Board will be decided by a majority of votes.

(5) The Board will be responsible to the Governor alone. He will be entitled to give them such general instructions with regard to matters of policy as in his discretion he may think requisite.

(6) As soon as may be after the Constitution has come into force the Board shall take over responsibility for the control and administration of the following establishments : —

(a) The Cyprus Technical Institute;

(b) the Teachers' Training Colleges;

(c) the English School at Nicosia and any other secondary, technical or commercial schools then conducted by the Government.

K.-PUBLIC SERVICE AND THE PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSION

(1) There shall be a Public Service Commission for the purpose of considering and recommending appointments, promotions, transfers when involving increase of salary, terminations of appointment, dismissals, and action affecting the disciplinary control of public officers. A public officer means for this purpose anyone who is in paid employment in the Public Service other than Her Majesty's aimed forces or the police or prison service; but the functions of the Public Service Commission shall not extend to a number of excepted cases, such as the Deputy Governor, judges and judicial officers, the Attorney-General, the Auditor-General and the holders of certain excepted posts designated by the Governor as being special or security posts.

(2) The members of the Public Service Commission will be appointed by the Governor after consultation with the Chief Minister and the Governor in his discretion will nominate which member shall be Chairman. They shall serve for a fixed term of years and will be eligible for reappointment.

(3) No one who is a member of the Legislative Assembly or is a public officer shall be qualified to act as a member of the Public Service Commission.

(4) The members of the Public Service Commission will be paid such salaries as the Governor may determine.

(5) The appointment, promotion, transfer, termination of appointment, dismissal and disciplinary control of public officers within the range of the Public Service Commission shall be vested in the Governor acting on and in accordance with their recommendation, provided that the Governor may act at his discretion with regard to any question of terminating the appointment of or dismissing any public officer if he decides that the interests of defence or internal security are involved in the matter.

(6) The Governor, after consultation with the Chief Minister and the Chairman of the Public Service Commission, may make general regulations for the Public Service Commission as to the manner in which it shall exercise its functions, provided that :

(a) it shall be the duty of the Public Service Commission at all times to hold a fair balance between the claims of members of different communities to opportunities of public service, so far as the needs of the public service allow;

(b) other-things being equal, a candidate of local origin shall be preferred when recruitment is being considered.

(7)–(i) The Deputy Governor will be appointed by the Governor on the instructions of the Secretary of State.

(ii) Holders of special posts, that is the Secretary of the Cabinet, Permanent Secretaries to Government Departments and holders of other posts of comparable importance designated by the Governor as special posts will be appointed and be removable by the Governor after consultation with the Chief Minister and the Chairman of the Public Service Commission.

L.—AUDITOR-GENERAL AND ATTORNEY-GENERAL

(1)–(i) There shall be an Auditor-General for Cyprus.

(ii) The Auditor-General will be appointed by the Governor, after consultation with the Chief Minister, and shall not be removable except by tile Governor on an address of-the Legislative Assembly carried by not less than three-quarters of its members praying for his removal on the ground of misconduct or infirmity of body or mind.

(iii) The Auditor-General will be subject to retirement at the age prescribed for the retirement of public officers in Cyprus.

(iv) The accounts of all Departments and Offices of Government, except those concerned with Governor's matters, shall be audited by the Auditor-General, and for this purpose all books, records and vouchers shall be open to him and his assistants for inspection.

(v) The Auditor-General shall report annually to the Legislative Assembly on the exercise of his functions.

(2)–(i) There shall be an Attorney-General for Cyprus.

(ii) The Attorney-General will be appointed and will be removable by the Governor on the recommendation of the Chief Minister.

(iii) He will be responsible for advising the Cabinet and the Ministers on all legal questions relating to self-governing matters, and for the initiation, conduct and, if necessary, the discontinuance of legal proceedings relating to them. He shall also advise the Governor when so requested.

(iv) The Attorney-General may be a member of the Legislative Assembly.

(3) The salaries of the Auditor-General and the Attorney-General shall be fixed by the Governor.

M.-TRIBUNAL OF GUARANTEES

(1) For the purpose of investigating any complaints of discrimination or other violations of fundamental rights guaranteed by the Constitution there shall be constituted a Tribunal which will have authority to enquire into any acts of Government alleged to be in violation of such rights.

(2) The jurisdiction of the Tribunal will not extend to laws of the Legislative Assembly, the validity of which may be determined by the Supreme Court alone, or to Ordinances made by the Governor but will extend to Orders and Regulations having the force of law as well as to executive acts.

(3) Complaints may be preferred to the Tribunal by individuals, associations or corporations. The Tribunal, while governing its procedure generally by the rules of equity and natural justice and paying regard to its own precedents in the course of its decisions, will have power to determine its own procedure.

(4) Unless the Tribunal sees special reason to the contrary in any particular case its decisions shall be announced in open Court and shall be accompanied by reasons. There will be no appeal from its decisions. The decision of a majority of the members sitting will be the decision of the Tribunal and only one decision is to be announced which will have effect as the decision of all.

(5) The Tribunal will be equipped with all necessary powers of summoning and examining witnesses and of requiring the production of documents, either from departments or offices of Government or from other sources.

(6) If the Tribunal finds a complaint well-founded it will have power, in its discretion, either to make a declaration of right alone or to annul the act of Government complained of or to refer it to the department or office of Government concerned with a recommendation as to the remedial action to be taken. The Tribunal will have the power to award compensation out of public funds.

(7) The jurisdiction of the Tribunal will extend to acts of Government relating to Governor's matters unless in any particular case the Governor files a declaration with the Tribunal to the effect that the complaint involves a subject which cannot be investigated without prejudice to the interests of defence or public security. Upon the filing of such a declaration the jurisdiction of the Tribunal will be withdrawn.

(8) The members of the Tribunal will be appointed by the Governor after consultation with the Chief Minister and the Chief Justice. They will serve for a fixed term of years, subject to re-appointment, at a remuneration which will be fixed in the first instance by the Governor, but will thereafter be such as may be determined by the Legislative Assembly, provided that no member's salary shall be diminished during his term of office nor shall any member be removable except by the Governor on an address of the Legislative Assembly carried by not less than three-quarters of its members praying for his removal on the ground of misconduct or infirmity of body or mind.

(9) The membership shall be so arranged that it includes an equal number of Greek and Turkish Cypriots and that the Chairman is neither Greek Cypriot nor Turkish Cypriot. The members will be selected so as to include persons of legal and administrative experience, provided that no Minister and no person holding a post in the Public Service (excluding the Judicature) can at the same time act as a member of the Tribunal.

(10) There shall be a Registrar of the Tribunal, who will be responsible for the administration of its office, and the proper record of all decisions. The Registrar will be a public officer within the scope of the Public Service Commission. His salary will be fixed by the Governor.

(11) The Tribunal shall present an annual Report to the Legislative Assembly upon the course and results of its work.

N.-AMENDMENT OF SPECIAL TURKISH LAWS

If at any time a petition is presented to the Governor on behalf of not less than two-thirds of the members of the Legislative Assembly elected by voters on the Turkish Cypriot Communal Roll and of not less than two-thirds of the members of the Evkaf Council praying for any specified amendments of or additions to any of the following laws, viz. :—

(i) The Turkish Family (Marriage and Divorce) Laws (1951 and 1954).

(ii) The Turkish Religious Head (Mufti) Law (1953).

(iii) The Turkish Family Courts Law (1954).

(iv) The Evkaf and Vakfs Law (1955),

and the Governor is satisfied (a) that such amendments or additions relate exclusively to matters of Turkish concern and (b) that it is not reasonably likely that a Bill to enact such amendments or additions in the Legislative Assembly would receive sufficient support to become law, he will have power to make a Regulation enacting such amendments or additions and thereupon the Regulation shall take effect as if it were a law duly passed by the Legislative Assembly and assented to by the Governor.

O.-GOVERNOR'S POWERS OF PARDON

(1) The power of pardon is reserved to the Governor. He may :

(a) grant to any person concerned in or convicted of any offence a pardon, either free or subject to lawful conditions; or

(b) grant to any person a respite, either indefinite or for a specified period, of the execution of any sentence; or

(d) remit the whole or any part of any sentence or of any penalty or forfeiture otherwise due to Her Majesty on account of an offence.

(2)—(a) Whenever a person has been sentenced to death the Governor will call upon the judge who presided at the trial to make a written report, and will cause this to be considered at a meeting of the Joint Council before deciding whether to exercise the power of pardon in accordance with his own discretion.

(b) Whenever a person has been sentenced to a penalty other than death, the Governor may cause the Joint Council to consider the case before deciding whether to exercise the power of pardon in accordance with his own discretion.

P.I.-FINANCE : SPECIAL PROVISIONS

(1) Cyprus Broadcasting Corporation.—The financial affairs of the Cyprus Broadcasting Corporation will be regulated as follows :—

(i) The Corporation is to maintain a fund into which shall be paid the receipts from broadcasting licences and its advertising revenue. Against these receipts will be charged the Corporation's annual expenditure (including necessary charges on any monies borrowed) together with any necessary expenses of collecting licences. The Corporation will have power to raise loans subject to the Governor's approval.

(ii) The Corporation is to keep proper accounts. They shall be audited by the Auditor-General who shall report on them to the Governor.

(iii) The Corporation must prepare and submit to the Governor each year estimates of its revenue and expenditure for the succeeding year. These estimates must show what (if any) deficit is anticipated on the year's working. Estimates may include a reasonable provision for contingencies, provided that the amount of this provision is not to be expended without the Governor's sanction.

(iv) The estimates will be subject to the Governor's approval. For the purpose of considering them he will invite the assistance and observations of the Minister of Finance and the Minister for Turkish Cypriot Affairs. In so far as he has approved them and a deficit is involved, he will be empowered to send a precept to the Minister of Finance certifying the amount required. This amount will then constitute a charge upon the Cyprus Consolidated Fund.

(v) The Corporation's annual accounts shall be laid before the Legislative Assembly together with the Auditor-General's report on them.

(2) Inter-Communal Education Board

(i) The Inter-Communal Education Board will maintain a fund into which shall be paid all sums received by it in respect of its operations and such other monies as may accrue to it by way of subvention from Her Majesty's Government, or from other sources. Against these receipts will be charged the Board's annual expenditure.

(ii) The Board's accounts shall be audited annually by the Auditor-General who shall report thereon to the Governor.

(3) Police Force and Prisons

(i) The cost of providing the Police Force and the prison service will be shared between the self-governing side and the Governor's side.

(ii) For this purpose the self-governing side shall raise and provide annually the sum of £750,000, being approximately the equivalent at present cost of the expenditure on the approved establishment of the police and prison services in the year 1954, and the balance will be found by the Governor's side. The £750,000 will be charged upon the Cyprus Consolidated Fund.

(iii) At any time not less than 5 years after the Constitution has come into force the sume of £750,000 i0 may be reviewed and a sum larger or smaller may be substituted in its place if the Governor and the Chief Minister so agree.

(4) Turkish Cypriot Affairs

(i) There shall be raised and provided annually a sum sufficient for the establishment of the Office of Turkish Cypriot Affairs and the discharge of its functions. This sum shall be ascertained under three separate heads. (a) establishment, (b) Turkish Cypriot education, (c) other functions.

(ii) The sum raised and provided for Turkish Cypriot elementary education in any year shall not be in less proportion to the sum raised and provided for Greek Cypriot elementary education in that year than that which the number of pupils receiving instruction in Turkish Cypriot elementary schools bears to the number of pupils receiving instruction in Greek Cypriot elementary schools at the close of the previous year.

(iii) The minimum sum raised and provided for Turkish Cypriot secondary education in any year shall not be less than the amount expended on such education in the last completed year before the coming into force of this Constitution.

(iv) The sum to be provided for Turkish Cypriot Affairs shall be discussed in the first instance by the Chief Minister and the Minister for Turkish Cypriot Affairs. If they fail to agree the matter shall be referred to the Governor, whose decision shall be final; and, the decision being given the Governor will send a precept to the Minister of Finance specifying the amount required. The sum so ascertained shall be a charge on the Cyprus Consolidated Fund.

P.II-FINANCE : SELF-GOVERNING MATTERS

(1) There shall be a Cyprus Consolidated Fund into which are to be paid all receipts and revenues arising in connection with self-governing matters and such other monies as may properly become available for appropriation by the Legislative Assembly. Provided that :

(a) Receipts from the issue of wireless licences shall be paid direct into the revenues of the Cyprus Broadcasting Corporation, and

(b) Receipts arising from the activities of the Inter-Communal Education Board shall be paid direct into the revenues of that Board.

(2) The Minister of Finance shall have annual estimates of revenue and expenditure on self-governing matters prepared. The estimates, when approved by the Cabinet, are to be laid before the Assembly.

(3) The proposals for all expenditure contained in the estimates will be submitted to the Legislative Assembly by means of an Appropriation Bill.

(4) When additional expenditure on existing services or any new senfice is incurred or is likely to be incurred during the year a supplementary Appropriation Bill shall be prepared. But this is not to exclude provision being made for meeting, urgent expenditure that may not have been foreseen.

(5) The following specific items will constitute a permanent annual charge on the Cyprus Consolidated Fund :

(a) the salaries and remuneration of-

(i) the Chief Justice and other Judges;

(ii) members of the Tribunal of Guarantees;

(iii) members of the Public Service Commission;

(iv) theAttorney-General

(v) the Auditor-General

(vi) the Clerk and Deputy Clerk of the Legislative Assembly;

(vii) the Registrar of the Tribunal of Guarantees.

(b) the sums required to pay the salaries of the Governor and Deputy Governor and the expenses of their official establishments;

(d) the sums mentioned in the Special Provisions which relate to the Cyprus Broadcasting Corporation, the Police Force and Prisons, the Turkish Cypriot Affairs;

(e) the sums required to meet contractual obligations to Public Officers (excluding members of the Police and Prison service and officers employed in the Governor's secretariat and departments), to pay their salaries and allowances and to pay superannuation benefits to retired Public Officers and their dependants.

(6) Any of the foregoing sums which are charged on the Cyprus Consolidated Fund may be paid in case of necessity on the authority of a warrant from the Governor.

P.III.-FINANCE : GOVERNOR'S MATTERS

(1) There will be a fund to be known as the Defence Fund into which will be paid all monies received in respect of Governor's Matters, and all other monies properly receivable by the Governor for appropriation by Ordinance.

(2) The Governor will make an Appropriation Ordinance in respect of annual expenditure. Before doing so he will prepare and submit estimates for the approval of a Secretary of State and as directed by him.

(3) No monies are to be paid from the Defence Fund except on warrant from the Governor duly executed in accordance with such instructions as may from time to time be issued by a Secretary of State.

(4) The Defence Fund will be audited in accordance with such directions as may be received through a Secretary of State.

Q.-EMERGENCY LAWS

(1) Notwithstanding anything that has gone before Her Majesty will be entitled by Order-in-Council at any time :

(a) to declare that a public emergency exists in Cyprus;

(b) to make provision for such measures as may appear necessary for dealing with the emergency security of public safety or order and of supplies and services in Cyprus during the period of such an emergency.